John Stuart Mill was born in 1806 and raised as an experiment. His father, James Mill, a close ally of Bentham, began teaching him Greek at three and Latin at eight, and by his teens the boy had read much of classical literature, logic and political economy. In 1822 he formed a small discussion group, the Utilitarian Society. Mill said he took the word "utilitarian" from a novel by John Galt, Annals of the Parish, though Bentham had used it earlier in letters.
Mill worked for most of his career at the East India Company's London office, from 1823 until the Company lost its powers in 1858, writing dispatches on the government of India. At twenty he suffered a mental crisis and came to feel that the Benthamite training had starved his feelings. He emerged convinced that imagination, poetry and character mattered to a happy life, and much of his later work tried to give utilitarianism a fuller picture of human beings.
The greatest happiness principle
Utilitarianism appeared as articles in Fraser's Magazine in 1861 and as a book in 1863. Its central claim is that "actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness." Mill famously added that some pleasures are higher in quality than others, a claim debated ever since. But the book is also an extended answer to objections, and those answers shaped the theory.
No time to calculate?
Critics said nobody can stop before every act to calculate its effects on the general happiness. Mill replied that we do not need to. Humanity has been learning the tendencies of actions through its whole history, and the results are stored in ordinary moral rules. Moral rules are "secondary principles" that sum up experience, the way sailors use a ready-made nautical almanac instead of calculating at sea. "Nobody argues that the art of navigation is not founded on astronomy," he wrote, "because sailors cannot wait to calculate the Nautical Almanack." We should appeal to the first principle directly only when secondary rules conflict.
The proof
In chapter four Mill offered what he called a proof, though he admitted that ultimate ends cannot be proved in the strict sense. "The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it." In the same way, Mill argued that the only evidence that something is desirable is that people actually desire it. Each person desires his own happiness, so happiness is a good to each, and the general happiness is a good to all together.
Critics pounced. The most common complaint, pressed by G. E. Moore in 1903 among others, is that "visible" means able to be seen, but "desirable" means worth desiring, so the comparison fails. People desire many things that are not worth desiring. A second complaint is that the step from each person's happiness to the general happiness is too quick. Defenders reply that Mill never claimed a deductive proof. He meant only that desire is the best evidence we have about what is good, and that a reasonable person should find his considerations persuasive.
Why be moral?
Mill also asked what would motivate people to follow the principle. He described external sanctions, the hope of praise and fear of blame from others or from God. But the deeper force is internal. The internal sanction is conscience, the painful feeling that comes with violating one's duty. Mill hoped education would strengthen a natural feeling of unity with others, until people cared about the general happiness as part of who they were.
Justice and rights
The last chapter, often called the most important, faces the strongest objection: that justice is something separate from utility and can override it. Mill granted that justice feels different, sterner and more binding than other duties. He explained this by what justice protects. Justice concerns security, which Mill called "the most vital of all interests", since without it nothing else we value can be enjoyed for more than a moment.
From this he built an account of rights. A right, for Mill, is something society ought to defend me in possessing, because doing so serves the general utility. Rights are not opposed to utility. They are the most important rules utility recommends, so important that we feel them as absolute. Whether that explanation succeeds is still disputed: critics say it makes rights hostage to calculation, while defenders say it explains both why rights matter and why they sometimes yield.
Worked example: the confidential record
A nurse learns that a patient, a local teacher, is being treated for depression. A parent asks the nurse whether the teacher is fit to be around children. A crude calculation might suggest that telling the parent would ease one person's worry at small cost. Mill would point to the secondary principle of confidentiality. Experience shows that if patients cannot trust that their records are private, many will avoid treatment altogether, and far more harm follows. He would also point to security: everyone's confidence in seeking care depends on the rule holding firm. The nurse should keep silent, and Mill would say this is because of utility, not in spite of it. Only a serious, specific danger to the children would bring the first principle back into play.
