The contract tradition promised that authority must rest on the agreement of free and equal persons. From the start, critics asked who counted as a person in that sentence.
Early objections
In 1706 the English writer Mary Astell asked the question in its sharpest form: "If all Men are born free, how is it that all Women are born Slaves?" Astell turned the contract theorists' premise of natural freedom against the subjection of wives to husbands. Locke had argued that kings had no natural right over subjects; Astell wondered why husbands should have one over wives. Hobbes is a revealing case. Hobbes held that in the state of nature, where no marriage law existed, dominion over a child belonged to the mother, since she could raise it or abandon it, yet in his commonwealths fathers ruled households.
Pateman: the sexual contract
In The Sexual Contract (1988) the political theorist Carole Pateman argued that the story of the original contract is only half told. The other half is a sexual contract that gave men political right over women. Pateman reread the debate between Locke and Filmer as a story of sons overthrowing a father. The brothers abolish the father's rule but share among themselves the rule over women. Pateman called the result fraternal patriarchy: the brothers replace the father's power but keep power over women.
Her deeper target was the ideal of contract itself. Contract is usually praised as the opposite of subordination: free people choosing their terms. Pateman argued that contracts such as marriage and employment can create relations of subordination rather than ending them. A worker agrees to a wage, but in doing so agrees to obey a boss for most of the waking day; historically, a bride agreed to marry, but the terms of marriage were set by law, not by her.
Okin: justice begins at home
Susan Moller Okin, in Justice, Gender, and the Family (1989), aimed her criticism at Rawls while keeping his method. Rawls had treated the parties in the original position as heads of households, which left the internal life of families unexamined. Okin argued that the family must itself be just because it is where children first learn about justice. She showed how marriage itself can leave women vulnerable: when a couple divides paid and unpaid work unequally, the partner who gives up income gains little bargaining power and loses badly if the marriage ends. Okin thought a properly applied veil of ignorance, behind which no one knows their sex, would condemn such arrangements. Annette Baier added a broader worry: a moral theory modeled on contracts between equals fits poorly with the many relationships of trust and care, such as those with infants and the frail, that are unequal by nature.
Mills: the racial contract
The Jamaican-born philosopher Charles Mills published The Racial Contract in 1997. He argued that the classical theories, written during the rise of European empires and Atlantic slavery, described a contract among whites that treated non-whites as outside its protections. Locke's investments and his property theory's colonial use are part of his evidence. Mills later turned his critique on method. In "Ideal Theory as Ideology" (2005), Mills argued that theorizing about a perfectly just society can hide existing injustice and serve the privileged. He urged philosophers to start from the world as it is, with its history of domination, and ask what justice requires there.
Fix the contract or drop it?
Defenders of the tradition reply that these failures were failures to apply its principles consistently, not flaws in the idea. If authority must be justifiable to each person, then excluding women, colonized peoples or enslaved people was a betrayal of the contract's own logic, and the critics were invoking it. Some critics accept this, aiming to correct the tradition; Mills described his project as an effort to fix contract theory, not abandon it. Others, like Pateman, doubt that contract can be rescued, since its picture of persons as owners of themselves who trade pieces of their freedom is part of the problem. Contract theory's defenders argue that its core demand, justifiability to each person, is what makes the exclusions visible as wrongs.
Worked example: who cuts back after the baby?
A couple, Dana and Sam, earn similar salaries. When their first child arrives, Sam's employer offers no flexibility, so Dana moves to part-time work. Ten years later Dana's earnings have fallen far behind, and her career options have narrowed. If they divorce, Sam leaves with a full career; Dana leaves with a gap in her record.
Apply the lenses. Okin would see here the vulnerability that marriage itself creates: an arrangement both partners chose freely, yet one that steadily shifted bargaining power toward Sam. Pateman would note that the employment contract shaped the marriage, since Sam's job assumed someone else would handle the care. A Rawlsian who follows Okin would ask whether people who did not know which partner they would be would accept rules that leave the carer so exposed. The point of the exercise is not to settle family policy but to see that consent within a relationship can still produce an injustice that the contract, looked at closely, should have prevented.
