The previous levels asked how poverty can be reduced. This one asks a moral question: what, if anything, do those of us who are comparatively well off owe to people in extreme poverty far away?

The drowning child

In 1972 the Australian philosopher Peter Singer published “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” written during a humanitarian crisis in what became Bangladesh. In paraphrase, his argument runs like this. Suppose you walk past a shallow pond and see a small child drowning. You could wade in and save the child, but you would get your clothes muddy. Almost everyone agrees you must save the child; the clothes do not matter compared with a life.

Singer then argues from a principle: if we can prevent something bad from happening without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought to do it. He adds that distance makes no moral difference; a child dying of a preventable disease far away is as real as one in the pond. Nor does it matter that many others could also help. If so, then people in rich countries who spend money on luxuries instead of giving to effective aid are doing something seriously wrong. Singer developed these ideas further in The Life You Can Save (2009).

Objections

Singer's argument has provoked many replies:

• Demandingness. Taken strictly, the principle seems to require giving until we are nearly as poor as those we help. Critics say a morality that asks almost everything of us cannot be right. Singer has also offered a weaker version of the principle, and his later public advice asks for a share of income most people can afford.
• Special obligations. Many people believe we owe more to family, neighbors and fellow citizens than to strangers. Defenders of Singer reply that special ties may justify some partiality but not ignoring dying children.
• The pond is different. The pond case involves one child, certain rescue and no one else present. Global poverty involves millions, uncertain effects and institutions. Some argue that this changes our duties.
• Justice, not charity. The philosopher Thomas Pogge argued, in paraphrase, that the main duty of rich countries is not to impose an unjust global order that harms the poor, such as unfair trade rules or support for corrupt rulers. On this view the issue is less generosity than stopping harm.
• Aid may not help. Easterly's skeptics, met in Level 4, question whether giving reliably helps. Singer answers that some programs are well evidenced.

Effective giving

Singer's argument helped inspire the effective altruism movement, which asks how to do the most good with a given amount of money or time. Charity evaluators such as GiveWell, founded in 2007, research which programs have strong evidence and low cost per life saved or improved, such as malaria prevention and cash transfers. Critics worry that this focus favors what is easy to measure and neglects systemic change, such as political reform, which is harder to quantify but may matter more.

Local agency and dignity

Every approach in this course faces the same test: does it treat poor people as agents of their own lives, or as objects of other people's plans? The most lasting progress has come from farmers, parents, workers, health workers, teachers and reformers in poor countries themselves. Outsiders can help, but good help listens first, supports local institutions, and is accountable to those it serves.

Universal Humanism begins from the claim that human worth does not depend on nation or class. If that is true, a child's death is no less a loss because of where it happens, and no one's dignity is diminished by their poverty. The practical questions remain hard. But they are questions about how best to honor an equal worth that does not stop at a border.

Worked example: a household budget meets the drowning child

Sam is a teacher in a rich country. After rent, food, transport and savings, Sam has about 300 a month left for leisure: restaurants, streaming services, a new phone every two years. Sam reads Singer's argument and wonders what to do.

Singer's strong principle would say: give whatever does not sacrifice something of comparable moral importance. A restaurant meal is not comparable to a child's life, so most of the 300 should go to effective programs.

The demandingness objection replies: a life with no room for one's own projects and pleasures is not what morality can ask. Many people, Singer included in his public advice, suggest a level such as a few percent or ten percent of income as a reasonable starting point.

Special obligations remind Sam that a sick parent or a struggling local school also has claims on Sam's time and money.

Pogge's view suggests that giving is not the whole answer: Sam might also support fairer trade rules, oppose deals that prop up corrupt rulers, or vote for policies that reduce harm abroad.

Effective giving suggests checking evidence: a malaria program with strong evidence may save far more lives per dollar than a well-known charity with little evidence.

Local agency asks whether the programs Sam supports are shaped by, and accountable to, the communities they serve.

Sam decides to give ten percent of income, split between an evidence-backed health program and a local-led organization, and to learn more about trade policy. Reasonable people would choose differently. The argument's value is that it forces the question to be asked.