Skip to main content

Rawls changes his framing

Liberals did not simply wait out the criticism. Some of their answers came from Rawls himself. In a 1985 essay and in Political Liberalism (1993), he recast his theory. Justice as fairness, he said, is political, not metaphysical: it rests on no deep claim about the true nature of the self. The original position does not describe what people are. It models how citizens should reason about the terms of their cooperation when they set aside, for that purpose only, facts that should not influence the result.

Rawls also gave a name to the fact that had always driven his theory. Reasonable pluralism is the lasting variety of reasonable views of the good that freedom produces. Wherever people think freely, they will reach different religious and moral conclusions, not from stupidity or bad faith but because these questions are hard. A state that enforced one view, even a communitarian one, could do so only by oppression.

The way forward, Rawls argued, is an overlapping consensus: agreement on justice reached from different moral doctrines. A Catholic, a Kantian and a utilitarian may each endorse equal liberty for their own reasons. A person can have deep, even constitutive attachments in private life while holding a shared, thinner political identity as a citizen.

Stepping back

Other liberals defended the idea of choice directly. They granted that we are shaped by communities, but insisted that people can step back and question their attachments, one at a time if not all at once. A person raised in a faith can come to doubt it; a citizen can come to think their country is in the wrong. The communitarian stress on given attachments, they argued, risks treating such people as traitors to themselves. Rawls himself never denied that families and faiths shape people; the question was only whether those attachments should set the terms of political justice for everyone.

Culture as context of choice

The Canadian philosopher Will Kymlicka tried to absorb the communitarian insight into liberalism. Cultural membership matters because it supplies the range of options from which people choose. A language and a culture give meaning to the choices we make; losing them shrinks what freedom can do. That gives liberals a reason to protect minority cultures, especially national minorities and indigenous peoples.

But Kymlicka drew a firm line. Groups may claim external protections, which shield them from pressure by the wider society, such as guaranteed land or language rights. They may not claim internal restrictions on members' own freedoms, such as forbidding members to leave, to marry outside the group, or to question its leaders. Community is valuable because of what it does for individuals, not as a rival to them.

Salem without witches

Other critics doubted that communitarians had a coherent program. The political theorist Amy Gutmann remarked, in a 1985 essay, that the critics seemed to want us to live in Salem without believing in witches. Her point was that communitarians want old bonds without old beliefs: the warmth of a tight-knit community without the shared convictions, and the persecution of dissenters, that held such communities together.

Feminist critics added a pointed reply. Appeals to past communities often hid the domination of women, servants and outsiders. Susan Moller Okin argued that the family, the most basic community of all, had been left out of theories of justice, and that traditions celebrated for their warmth had often handed women unpaid labor and little voice. Community, on this view, needs justice as much as justice needs community.

Narrowing the gap

By the late 1990s many participants agreed that the two camps were closer than the early polemics suggested. Most communitarians accepted basic rights; most liberals accepted that people are socially formed and that shared institutions need support. The live questions became narrower and more useful: which groups may ask for special treatment, what a state may do to foster civic virtue, and where individual exit must always be protected. Some writers began to speak of communitarian liberalism, a sign that the labels mattered less than the questions.

Worked example: the Amish and the schoolhouse

In 1972 the US Supreme Court decided Wisconsin v. Yoder. Amish parents had refused to send their children to school after the eighth grade, as state law required up to age sixteen. They argued that further schooling would draw their children away from a religious community built on farming, humility and separation from the world. The Court sided with the parents. Its opinion leaned heavily on the Amish community's long record as law-abiding and self-supporting, which leaves a hard question: would a newer or less admired group have won?

The case divides people in revealing ways. A communitarian may see a fragile community protecting the practices that make it what it is. Kymlicka's framework raises a harder question: does the exemption shield the community from outside pressure, or restrict its own young members' ability to choose another life? Justice William O. Douglas, partly dissenting, argued that the children's own wishes should be heard. Each side claims to defend real persons; they disagree about which person, the parent or the future adult, comes first.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. What did Rawls mean by calling justice as fairness political, not metaphysical?
2. What does Rawls mean by an overlapping consensus?
3. What is reasonable pluralism?
4. Why did Kymlicka think cultural membership matters?
5. Which group claims did Kymlicka reject?
6. What did Amy Gutmann's remark about Salem suggest?
7. Which point do liberals stress about our attachments?
8. What point did feminist critics raise about past communities?

CivilSimian.com created by AxiomaticPanic, CivilSimian, Kalokagathia