The Treaty of Nanjing was short, only thirteen articles, but it began a new era in China's relations with the outside world. Its terms, and those that followed within two years, created what Chinese nationalists would later call the unequal treaties.
The terms of 1842
China opened five ports to British trade and residence: Canton, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Ningbo and Shanghai. British consuls could live in each. Hong Kong Island was ceded to Britain in perpetuity. The Qing agreed to pay an indemnity of 21 million silver dollars over several years, of which six million covered the opium Lin had destroyed, so that in the end Chinese taxpayers paid for Elliot's promise. The treaty abolished the Cohong merchant monopoly, so foreigners could trade with any Chinese merchant they chose. Officials of the two countries were to correspond as equals, a direct rejection of the old idea that foreign rulers were tributaries.
One word was missing. The treaty did not mention opium at all. Britain wanted it legalized, the Qing refused, and both sides left the question unspoken. The trade went on, still illegal, now protected in practice by British naval power and the new colony at Hong Kong.
The supplements of 1843 and 1844
Further agreements in 1843, including the Treaty of the Bogue, filled in details. Import and export duties were set at low fixed rates, around 5 percent of value on most goods, and could not be changed without British consent. China had lost control of its own tariff, a power almost every sovereign state took for granted.
Two other principles proved even more lasting. The first was extraterritoriality. A British subject accused of a crime in China was tried by a British consul under British law, not by a Chinese magistrate. The Qing negotiators did not at first see this as a great concession, since it spared officials the trouble of judging unruly foreigners. It grew into a system in which foreigners, and later some Chinese who worked for them or joined their churches, could escape Chinese courts.
The second was the most-favored-nation clause. Any privilege China granted to other powers would go to Britain too. Other powers soon demanded the same terms. The United States signed the Treaty of Wangxia in 1844, negotiated by the American envoy Caleb Cushing, which spelled out extraterritoriality in more detail. France signed the Treaty of Whampoa the same year and soon won toleration for Catholic missionaries. Because each power held a most-favored-nation clause, every gain by one became a gain for all. The system turned in only one direction.
Why did the Qing accept?
The court had little choice, but the officials who negotiated, led by the Manchu noble Qiying, also misjudged what mattered. They cared most about ending the war, keeping the foreigners away from Beijing and preserving the dynasty's dignity. Fixed tariffs and consular courts looked like technical matters, a way of managing troublesome outsiders by giving them rules. Only later did Chinese reformers see these terms as a steady erosion of sovereignty.
The treaty ports
Shanghai, near the mouth of the Yangzi, grew fastest. The Land Regulations of 1845 set aside an area outside the walled city for British residents. American and French areas followed, and over time the foreign settlements developed their own councils, police and courts. By the end of the century Shanghai was one of the great cities of Asia, where Chinese and foreigners lived side by side, but on unequal terms. Canton, by contrast, resisted. Its people and gentry refused to let the British enter the walled city, and this "entry question" festered for fifteen years.
The phrase "unequal treaties" came into wide use only in the early twentieth century, when Chinese nationalists campaigned to abolish them. It captures something real: the obligations ran one way, and Chinese subjects in Britain received nothing comparable in return. But historians also note that some Qing officials welcomed fixed rules, and that many Chinese merchants in the treaty ports prospered.
Worked example: a brawl in a treaty port
Imagine that in 1850 a British sailor and a Chinese porter fight on the docks at Fuzhou, and the porter is badly hurt. Under the treaties, the sailor goes before the British consul, who applies British law, perhaps with no jury and limited evidence from Chinese witnesses who speak no English. Had the porter been the attacker, he would have faced a Chinese magistrate. The victim's family may feel that justice depends on the nationality of the accused. Defenders of extraterritoriality argued that Qing courts could use torture to extract confessions and punish relatives of the accused, and that no Western government would let its citizens face that. Critics replied that a state that cannot try crimes on its own soil is not fully sovereign. Both points have force. The case shows how a rule meant to protect individuals can, when applied in only one direction, also become a marker of one people's subordination to another.
