The image of the Spanish Inquisition as a court mainly for Jews and Protestants fits its first half century but not most of its history. From the mid sixteenth century the majority of people it tried were Old Christians accused of saying the wrong thing, marrying twice or misbehaving in church. Its records turn out to be one of the richest windows anywhere into what ordinary people thought.
Counting the cases
In the 1980s the historians Jaime Contreras and Gustav Henningsen analyzed summaries of trials that local tribunals sent each year to the Suprema. Their work covered about 44,000 cases between 1540 and 1700. It showed that the largest single category was not Judaizing but propositions, while Moriscos, Judaizers and suspected Protestants made up other large groups. It also suggested that fewer than two percent of the accused in this period were executed in person. These figures depend on the survival of the summaries, which is uneven, but they changed how historians describe the tribunal after its violent first decades.
Propositions and blasphemy
A proposition was a statement that touched on faith. Many people were tried for saying in a tavern or a field that simple fornication, sex between unmarried people, was not a sin. Others said that a good Jew or Muslim could be saved, that priests lived better than they preached, or that the Virgin had not stayed a virgin. Blasphemy, an oath spoken in anger at cards or at work, was another common charge. Punishment was usually light: a public abjuration, a fine, a few lashes or a period of exile. The aim was to teach people where the line lay.
Marriage, priests and sex
The Inquisition also tried bigamy. A man who left one wife in Spain and married again in another province or across the Atlantic seemed to show contempt for the sacrament of marriage, which brought the matter within the court's reach. Priests who used the confessional to seduce penitents were tried for solicitation. In the Crown of Aragon, but not in Castile, the tribunals also judged sodomy, under a papal grant of 1524; in Castile it remained a matter for royal courts. These cases show the tribunal acting as a court of morals as well as doctrine.
Moriscos before the tribunal
Muslims forced to convert in the early sixteenth century and their descendants, the Moriscos, formed another large group, above all in Valencia and Aragon, where whole villages were Morisco. They were tried for fasting in Ramadan, ritual washing, circumcision, owning Arabic books or simply praying in Arabic. Lords who depended on Morisco tenants often protected them. In Valencia a 1571 agreement let Moriscos pay an annual sum in return for protection of their property from confiscation, which shows how far money and local power shaped the tribunal's work.
The Basque witch trials
Northern Europe in this period executed many thousands for witchcraft, and in 1609 and 1610 Spain came close to joining it. Accusations spread through villages in Navarre near the French border, especially Zugarramurdi. The tribunal of Logroño held an auto in November 1610 at which six people were burned in person as witches and five more in effigy, as they had died in prison.
Then the most junior of the three inquisitors at Logroño, Alonso de Salazar Frías, toured the region with an edict of grace in 1611. He interviewed about 1,800 people, many of them children, who confessed to or described witchcraft. He checked their stories against each other, had supposed witches' ointments tested, and found no evidence that any of it had happened. He reported that the outbreak grew as people talked and preached about it. In 1614 the Suprema issued instructions that made witchcraft convictions extremely hard to obtain, and Spain saw almost no executions for witchcraft afterward.
Worked example: why a feared court was skeptical
The witch case looks like a paradox. How did the tribunal famous for burning heretics become one of the most cautious courts in Europe on witchcraft? Consider the structure. A local secular court in the German lands might act on village panic with few checks. The Inquisition, by contrast, required written reports, theological review and the approval of a central council far from the scene. The same bureaucracy that made it powerful also made it slow, and slowness gave doubt time to work.
Consider also the people. Salazar was trained in law and treated confessions as evidence to be tested rather than as proof. The Danish historian Gustav Henningsen, who studied his papers, called him the witches' advocate. The lesson is not that the Inquisition was gentle. It is that the same institution could produce Lucero in Córdoba and Salazar in Navarre, and that the difference often lay in whether its officials insisted that claims be checked against facts. Rules about evidence protect people only when someone is willing to apply them against the mood of a crowd.
