The National Assembly gave Germany a constitution that many contemporaries called the most democratic in the world. It was drafted mainly by Hugo Preuss, a liberal lawyer of Jewish background whom Ebert asked to prepare a text in November 1918. After months of debate the Assembly adopted it on 31 July 1919, and Ebert signed it on 11 August. Its first article declared: "The German Reich is a republic. State authority derives from the people." The hard question is whether the design itself helped destroy the democracy it created.
Parliament and elections
The Reichstag was elected by all men and women over 20 using proportional representation, with roughly one seat for every 60,000 votes a party won. There was no minimum threshold, so small parties could win seats with a tiny share of the vote. Supporters saw this as fair, since every vote counted and every current of opinion was heard. The chancellor and ministers needed the Reichstag's confidence and had to resign if it voted them out. A second chamber, the Reichsrat, represented the federal states, of which Prussia, with about three fifths of the population, was by far the largest.
A strong president
Many framers distrusted party government and wanted a counterweight to it. The sociologist Max Weber, who advised on the draft, argued for a president chosen by the people, who could offer leadership above party quarrels. The result was a president directly elected for a seven-year term, with powers that together made him far more than a figurehead. He appointed and dismissed the chancellor, commanded the armed forces, and could dissolve the Reichstag and call new elections. Under Article 48, the president could take emergency measures, including use of the army, when public order and safety were seriously threatened, and could temporarily suspend several basic rights. The Reichstag could demand that such measures be withdrawn, but a president who could also dissolve the Reichstag had ways around that check. A law meant to define the limits of Article 48 was promised but never passed.
Rights and social promises
The second half of the constitution set out basic rights and duties. Alongside freedom of speech, assembly, religion and the press, it declared that men and women had in principle the same civic rights and duties. It went further than most constitutions of its time into social and economic life, promising protection for labor, a broad system of social insurance and workers' councils in the workplace. Article 151 said that economic life must be organized according to principles of justice, with the aim of securing a life worthy of human beings for all. Many of these clauses were programs rather than rights a citizen could enforce in court, but they expressed a vision of a social state that would protect human dignity as well as liberty.
The constitution also allowed citizens to propose laws directly through a popular initiative followed by a referendum. Only two national referendums were ever held, and both failed, but the second of them, against a reparations settlement in 1929, gave the extreme right a national platform.
Was the design to blame?
After 1945 many observers blamed the constitution itself. Proportional representation, they argued, multiplied parties, made stable majorities almost impossible and let extremist movements win seats early. In 1930 more than a dozen parties entered the Reichstag, and the republic went through about twenty cabinets in fourteen years. The strong president, on this view, offered parliament an escape from responsibility: when coalition partners could not agree, they could let the president govern by decree.
Other historians answer that institutions amplify conflicts rather than create them. Germany's parties were rooted in deep divisions of class, religion and region that any electoral system would have reflected. A system of single-member districts might even have handed the Nazis a majority of seats once they became the largest party in 1932. Article 48 had been used by Ebert in the crises of 1923 to save the republic, which shows that it could defend democracy as well as undermine it. What mattered most, these scholars argue, was who held the office and whether the parties were willing to compromise.
Worked example: three articles that add up
Picture a chancellor who has lost his majority. Under ordinary parliamentary rules he must build a new coalition or resign. Now add three provisions. Article 53 lets the president appoint any chancellor he likes, whether or not that person has a majority behind him. Article 48 lets that chancellor govern by emergency decree, as long as the president signs. Article 25 lets the president dissolve the Reichstag if it votes to cancel the decrees, which means months without a sitting parliament while elections are held.
Each provision looked sensible on its own, and each had a reasonable purpose: a head of state able to break a deadlock, act in a sudden crisis and appeal to the voters. Combined, they allowed a government to rule for long periods without the support of the people's elected representatives. The framers imagined emergencies lasting weeks. They did not imagine a president who would use the same tools for years, or parties that would prefer this arrangement to the hard work of compromise. That gap between design and use would become fatal after 1930.
