People often say that technology is just a tool: a hammer can build a house or break a window, and what matters is how people use it. This idea is called the neutrality thesis: technologies have no values of their own; only their users do. It contains real truth. The same chemistry gives us fertilizer and explosives, and the same network carries love letters and scams. But philosophers and historians of technology have argued that the picture is incomplete.
Do artifacts have politics?
In a 1980 essay titled “Do Artifacts Have Politics?”, the American political theorist Langdon Winner argued, in paraphrase, that technical things can embody forms of power and social order, so choosing a technology can also mean choosing a way of living together. He described two ways this happens.
- Design choices that settle a social question. Winner's best known example concerned the New York planner Robert Moses, who, Winner reported, built low overpasses on Long Island parkways so that buses, and therefore many poorer and Black residents who relied on them, could not reach certain public beaches. Later researchers disputed the story, noting that commercial vehicles were already barred from those parkways and that other routes existed. The example is contested, but the general point survives: a design can include or exclude people, as a building with only stairs excludes wheelchair users whether or not anyone intended it.
- Technologies that fit some arrangements better than others. Winner suggested that some systems, such as nuclear power with its need for tight security and central control, sit more easily with hierarchical management, while others, such as small-scale solar power, fit more easily with decentralized arrangements.
Unintended consequences
Even well-meant technologies have effects nobody planned. The sociologist Robert K. Merton wrote about the unanticipated consequences of purposeful action in 1936. A striking case is the American engineer Thomas Midgley, who in the 1920s developed both the lead additive for gasoline and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) for refrigerators. CFCs seemed safe because they were stable and non-toxic. In 1974 scientists showed that they could destroy the ozone layer that shields life from ultraviolet radiation, and the 1987 Montreal Protocol phased them out. Leaded gasoline, meanwhile, spread lead pollution worldwide for decades. The lesson: a technology that seems safe can have serious effects no one planned.
The Collingridge dilemma
In 1980 the British scholar David Collingridge described a problem every society faces. When a technology is new, it is easy to change but its effects are hard to predict; by the time its effects are clear, it is so widely used that changing it is hard and costly. This is called the Collingridge dilemma. Common responses include small pilot programs, ongoing monitoring and designing systems that can be adjusted later.
The Luddites, accurately
Today “Luddite” is an insult for anyone who dislikes new gadgets. The real Luddites were English textile workers who, between 1811 and 1816, broke machines in Nottinghamshire, Yorkshire and Lancashire, signing their letters in the name of a mythical leader, “General Ludd.” They were skilled workers facing wage cuts, unemployment and cheap, poor-quality goods during wartime hardship. Historians generally agree that they were protesting how machines were being used against their livelihoods, not machinery as such; many had worked with machines for years. Parliament made machine breaking a capital crime in 1812, thousands of troops were sent to the affected regions, and some Luddites were hanged or transported to Australia.
The lesson for this course is not that the Luddites were right or wrong about technology. It is that arguments about technology are often arguments about who benefits, who bears the costs and who decides.
Worked example: scooters on Main Street
Imagine a city council deciding whether to let a company place rental electric scooters around downtown. Riders unlock them with a phone app and leave them anywhere when they finish. Supporters say scooters replace short car trips and help people without cars reach jobs. How do the ideas in this level help?
Is the scooter neutral? In one sense yes: a scooter can carry a nurse to work or a teenager on a joyride. But the system around it is designed. Requiring a smartphone and a bank card shapes who can use it. Letting riders drop scooters anywhere shifts a cost onto everyone who uses the sidewalk, including wheelchair users and blind pedestrians. These are Winner's kind of design choices.
Unintended consequences. Cities that have tried scooters have reported rider injuries, cluttered sidewalks and scooters dumped in rivers, along with real gains in short trips. Some effects only appear after launch.
The Collingridge dilemma. Right now the council can set any rules it likes, but it cannot know exactly what will happen. Once thousands of residents rely on scooters, changing course will be harder. A sensible response is a pilot: a one-year permit, a cap on numbers, required parking zones, shared data on trips and crashes, and a public review at the end.
The Luddite question. Delivery cyclists and taxi drivers might object that the scheme threatens their income. Their complaint, like the Luddites', is less about the machine itself than about who gains and who loses. Asking who benefits, who bears the costs and who decides turns a shouting match into a policy discussion.
