The outsider
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788 to 1860) was born in Danzig to a wealthy merchant family. His mother, Johanna, became a successful novelist who ran a literary salon in Weimar. An inheritance freed him from ever needing a salary. In 1818 he published his masterpiece, The World as Will and Representation, convinced he had solved the riddle of existence. Almost nobody noticed.
Schopenhauer saw himself as Kant's only true heir and regarded Fichte, Schelling and above all Hegel as windbags who had betrayed him. In 1820, newly allowed to lecture in Berlin, he scheduled his lectures at Hegel's hour and drew few students. The course soon lapsed. Fame came only in his sixties, after a book of essays in 1851 found a wide public.
The world as representation
His book opens, in the 1883 translation by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp: "'The world is my idea:' this is a truth which holds good for everything that lives and knows." The world as we experience it is representation, the world as it appears, shaped by the mind's forms. Here Schopenhauer follows Kant, though he simplified Kant's twelve categories to one: causality, which together with space and time makes up the form of all experience.
The world as will
Then he made a move Kant had forbidden. Kant said the thing in itself is unknowable. Schopenhauer said we have one door to it: our own bodies, felt from inside as urges and striving. I see my arm from outside as an object among objects, but I also know it from within as my willing. My body is will made visible.
Schopenhauer then extended the point to everything. The thing in itself is will: a blind, aimless striving with no goal beyond itself. It shows itself in the fall of a stone, the growth of a plant, the hunger of an animal and the ambitions of a human being. This will is not rational and not divine. Where Hegel saw reason unfolding through history, Schopenhauer saw an endless, purposeless urge.
Why life hurts
From this followed his famous pessimism. To will is to lack something, and lack is pain. Satisfaction is brief and negative, merely the removal of a want, and it soon breeds new wants or the emptiness of having none. Life, he wrote, swings like a pendulum between pain and boredom. Struggle among creatures, each the same will tearing at itself, fills the world with suffering.
Three ways out
Schopenhauer offered partial escapes. The first is art. In contemplating beauty we forget our wants for a moment and become pure, will-less observers of the timeless forms of things. Among the arts music stands highest, because it copies the will itself, not merely its forms. Composers took notice: Richard Wagner read him with passion.
The second is ethics. Schopenhauer rejected Kant's moral law, which he thought was a disguised divine command dressed in reason. The real basis of morality, he argued in an essay written for a Danish prize competition, is compassion, feeling another's suffering as one's own. In compassion the wall between persons, which belongs only to the world of appearance, falls away, and I recognize the same inner being in you as in me. Here he found echoes in the Upanishads, which he read in a Latin translation, and in Buddhism: "that art thou."
The third and highest is denial of the will, as practised by ascetic saints of many traditions, who stop striving altogether. Schopenhauer admired this path more than he walked it; he lived comfortably, played the flute daily and dined well.
The legacy of German idealism
Schopenhauer's will shaped Nietzsche, Wagner, Thomas Mann and the young Wittgenstein, and his picture of hidden drives anticipated later theories of the unconscious. Hegel's dialectic passed to Marx, provoked Kierkegaard's defense of the single individual, and inspired idealists in Britain and America. And Kant's claim that persons have dignity, not a price, stands behind the language of modern human rights.
Worked example: the man on the tracks
On 2 January 2007, in a New York subway station, a young man had a seizure and fell onto the tracks as a train approached. Wesley Autrey, a construction worker waiting with his two young daughters, jumped down, pressed the man into the drainage trench between the rails and held him there as the train passed over them both. Both survived. Asked why, Autrey said he had simply seen someone who needed help.
Schopenhauer thought such acts are the great mystery of ethics. Why would anyone risk their life for a stranger? Self-interest cannot explain it, and he doubted that abstract reasoning about universal law moves anyone so fast. His answer was compassion: in that instant the distinction between "me" and "him" loses its grip, and the other's danger is felt as one's own.
A Kantian could reply that Autrey's quickness reflects a character trained by principle, and that compassion alone is unreliable, flaring for the person in front of us and fading for distant strangers. That exchange, between a morality of reason and a morality of fellow feeling, is still very much alive.
