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Would you rather have 100 dollars today or 100 dollars in ten years? Almost everyone picks today, and with good reason. Money in hand can be invested, spent on urgent needs or simply enjoyed while you are sure to be around. Economists capture this with a discount rate, and the choice of that one number turns out to shape some of the largest policy decisions of our time.

How discounting works

Governments and companies compare costs and benefits that arrive at different times. To add them up, they convert future amounts into today's terms. Discounting converts a future cost or benefit into a present value by shrinking it at a fixed rate for each year of delay. At a 5 percent rate, 105 dollars a year from now is worth 100 dollars today. The effect compounds. At 5 percent a year, a harm worth 1 million dollars a century from now counts for only about 7,600 dollars today, while at 1 percent it counts for about 370,000 dollars. Over long spans, small differences in the rate decide whether protecting the future looks like a bargain or a waste.

Two reasons to discount

There are two quite different reasons for valuing the future less. The first is pure time preference: counting a unit of wellbeing as less important simply because it comes later. The second is growth. If people in the future are likely to be much richer, an extra dollar will mean less to them than to someone poorer today. The growth argument says future benefits count for less because richer future people gain less from each extra dollar.

The Cambridge mathematician Frank Ramsey combined these in a famous 1928 paper on saving. In effect, the discount rate equals pure time preference plus a growth term: how fast the economy is expected to grow, multiplied by how quickly the value of extra consumption falls as people get richer. Yet Ramsey refused to use pure time preference when judging what a society should do. He called discounting later enjoyments "ethically indefensible" and said the practice "arises merely from the weakness of the imagination." Ramsey held that pure time preference is ethically indefensible, a product of weak imagination, though he accepted discounting for growth.

The Stern and Nordhaus debate

The argument went public in 2006, when the British economist Nicholas Stern published a review of climate change for the UK Treasury. Stern used a pure time preference of just 0.1 percent a year, justified only by the small chance that humanity might not survive, and an overall discount rate of about 1.4 percent. The Stern Review's very low discount rate made strong, early action against climate change look clearly worthwhile.

The American economist William Nordhaus, later awarded a Nobel prize for his climate economics, objected. Nordhaus argued that discount rates should reflect the returns people actually earn on investments in markets, which are much higher. With those rates, his models favored a gradual ramp of climate policy, starting moderately and tightening over time. He also noted that money spent cutting emissions could instead be invested in schools, medicine or roads that would help future people too.

Each side has a point. A rate drawn from markets reflects real opportunities, but markets record the impatience of people alive now, the only ones trading.

Uncertainty and falling rates

A third idea has gained ground. If we are unsure whether the right rate is 1 percent or 7 percent, the low-rate possibility dominates over long horizons, because it is the one in which distant values remain large. Uncertainty about which rate is right is the main argument for discount rates that decline over longer horizons. Britain's official guidance for appraising public projects, the Green Book, uses 3.5 percent for the first thirty years and lower rates after that.

Critics of very low rates raise a serious objection too. If the future counts almost as much as the present and the future is very long, almost any sacrifice now might be justified by tiny gains spread over centuries. The excessive sacrifice objection warns that near-zero discounting could demand that the present give up nearly everything for people who will probably be richer anyway.

Worked example: the seawall

A coastal city can build a seawall for 100 million dollars today. Engineers expect it to prevent a single flood that would cause 1 billion dollars of damage in eighty years. At a 1 percent discount rate, that avoided damage is worth about 450 million dollars today, so the wall is an easy choice. At 4 percent it is worth about 43 million, and the wall fails the test. Using the Green Book's falling schedule, which drops to 3 percent after thirty years and 2.5 percent after seventy-five, the figure rises to roughly 83 million: closer, but still short. Nothing in the arithmetic says which rate is right. A Stern-minded analyst would note that the flood might kill people, not just damage buildings, and that the growth argument assumes the city will be richer in eighty years, which a declining port town may not be. A Nordhaus-minded analyst would ask what else the 100 million could buy, such as better schools whose benefits also reach the future. The rate is where the ethics hides.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. What does discounting do in policy analysis?
2. At a 5 percent rate, roughly what is a 1 million dollar harm a century away worth today?
3. What does the growth argument for discounting say?
4. What did Ramsey say about pure time preference in social choices?
5. What did the Stern Review's low discount rate imply?
6. What did Nordhaus argue discount rates should reflect?
7. What is the main argument for discount rates that fall over long horizons?
8. What does the excessive sacrifice objection warn?

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