Utilitarianism and Kantian ethics both focus on the question “what should I do?” Virtue ethics starts from a different question: “what kind of person should I be?” Its roots lie in ancient Greece, above all in the work of Aristotle (384 to 322 BCE), especially the Nicomachean Ethics.
The good life
Aristotle observed that we do most things for the sake of something else: we earn money to buy things, and buy things to live well. But there must be some final goal pursued for its own sake. He called it eudaimonia, usually translated as “happiness” but better rendered as flourishing or living well. It is not a passing feeling but a quality of a whole life. In W.D. Ross's 1925 translation, Aristotle remarks that “one swallow does not make a summer,” and neither does one good day make a person happy.
The function argument
A good knife cuts well and a good flute player plays well: being good at something means performing its characteristic activity excellently. The characteristic activity of human beings, Aristotle claimed, is living according to reason. So human flourishing consists in activity in accordance with virtue (in Greek, aretē, meaning excellence).
Virtues as habits
A virtue is a settled trait of character: a disposition to feel and act well. Aristotle stressed that virtues are not inborn; they are developed by habituation. We become just by doing just acts and brave by doing brave acts, the way we become builders by building. Moral education, on this view, is more like training than lecturing.
The doctrine of the mean
Aristotle described many virtues as a mean between two extremes, one of excess and one of deficiency:
- Courage lies between cowardice and rashness.
- Generosity lies between stinginess and wastefulness.
- Proper pride lies between undue humility and vanity.
The mean is not simple moderation or an average. The courageous response to a real threat might be very strong action. The mean is what is right for this person, in this situation, toward these people, at this time.
Practical wisdom
Finding the mean requires practical wisdom (phronesis): the ability to see what a situation calls for and how to act on it. No rulebook can replace it. Like an experienced doctor or ship's captain, the practically wise person has learned to perceive what matters in particular cases.
The revival of virtue ethics
Virtue ideas stayed central to ethics for centuries, but in the modern era rule-based theories overshadowed them. In 1958 the British philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe argued that modern moral philosophy had lost its way, relying on ideas of moral obligation that no longer had a clear basis, and urged a return to questions of character and human flourishing. Later thinkers such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse helped revive virtue ethics as a major theory.
Strengths
Virtue ethics speaks to the whole of moral life, including emotions, friendships and motives, not only isolated decisions. It explains why we admire people who do good gladly rather than grudgingly, and it treats moral growth as a lifelong project.
Criticisms
- Action guidance. “Do what a virtuous person would do” may not help someone who does not know what that is. Defenders reply that the virtues themselves give guidance: be honest, be kind, be fair.
- Cultural variation. Lists of virtues differ across societies. Aristotle's own list reflects the values of a free Greek man, and he defended slavery and the inferiority of women.
- Conflicting virtues. Honesty and kindness can pull in different directions, and the theory relies heavily on judgment to settle such conflicts.
- Situationism. Some philosophers, drawing on psychology experiments, argue that behavior depends more on circumstances than on stable traits, questioning whether robust virtues exist at all.
Worked example: the friend's business plan
A close friend is about to put her savings into opening a restaurant. She shows you her plan and asks what you think. You notice serious problems: the rent is very high, the location has little foot traffic, and her budget leaves no cushion for a slow first year.
A utilitarian would ask which response produces the best outcome; a Kantian would stress the duty not to deceive. A virtue ethicist asks: what would an honest, kind and practically wise friend do here?
Honesty, on Aristotle's model, is a mean. One extreme is flattery: telling her what she wants to hear. The other is harsh bluntness: listing every flaw coldly, perhaps even enjoying being right. Neither is what a good friend does. The virtuous response tells the truth about the serious risks, because a real friend cares about her actual good, not only her feelings today. But it does so with tact, at a good moment, in a way she can hear, perhaps suggesting ways to fix the problems.
What does the work here is not a formula but practical wisdom, which includes knowing this friend, how she takes criticism, and how much is at stake. Notice too that the virtuous person does not merely act well but feels appropriately: concern for her, not pleasure in pointing out mistakes. Aristotle held that someone who does the right thing while resenting it has not yet fully acquired the virtue.
Critics would say this leaves a great deal to judgment. Defenders reply that real moral life does too.