If dualism struggles to explain how mind and body interact, the obvious alternative is that there is only one kind of thing. Physicalism holds that everything that exists is physical, or is fixed by the physical facts. On this view your experience of a sunset is a brain process, or is wholly determined by one, in the way a traffic jam is wholly determined by the cars. In surveys of professional philosophers, physicalism about the mind is the most common position, held by roughly half. It also faces one of the most discussed thought experiments of the last half century.
The identity theory
The first modern physicalist theory came from two philosophers who worked in Australia. In 1956 U. T. Place published a paper asking whether consciousness is a brain process, and in 1959 J. J. C. Smart defended the same idea. Their identity theory held that conscious states are identical to brain processes, in the way that lightning turned out to be an electrical discharge. Nobody discovered lightning to be caused by discharge, or correlated with it: lightning simply is discharge. Likewise, the theory says, a sensation simply is a certain process in the brain, discovered as a matter of fact through science, not by analyzing what words mean.
Mary's room
In 1982 the Australian philosopher Frank Jackson published "Epiphenomenal Qualia," which introduced a scientist named Mary. Mary is brilliant and has spent her whole life in a black-and-white room, learning about the world through black-and-white books and a black-and-white screen. She becomes the world's expert on color vision. She knows all the physical facts about color: the wavelengths, the cells in the eye, the brain processes, how people use color words. Then she is released and sees a red tomato for the first time.
Does she learn something new? Jackson said yes: she learns what it is like to see red. If so, she knew all the physical facts and still did not know everything. So there are facts that are not physical facts, and physicalism is false. This is the knowledge argument.
Replies
Physicalists have offered several replies, and each concedes something different.
The ability hypothesis, defended by David Lewis and Laurence Nemirow, says Mary gains new abilities, not new facts. She can now recognize red on sight, imagine it and remember it. Knowing how is not knowing that, so no new fact about the world is involved.
The acquaintance reply, from Earl Conee, says Mary becomes directly acquainted with a property she already knew about, in the way you might know all about a city from maps and then visit it. Meeting a thing is not learning a new fact about it.
The phenomenal concept strategy, now perhaps the most popular reply, says Mary gains a new concept, a new way of thinking about a physical fact she already knew. Compare someone who knows that the water in a glass is H2O in chemistry class, and later picks up a glass of water without thinking of chemistry at all. One fact, two ways of grasping it. On this view, the experience gives Mary an inside way of thinking about a brain state she had only grasped from the outside.
Dennett gave a blunter reply: if Mary really knew everything physical, she would not be surprised by red at all. Our sense that she must learn something comes from underestimating what knowing all the physical facts would involve.
Perhaps the most striking twist is that Jackson himself changed his mind. By the end of the 1990s he had become a physicalist, arguing that the intuition behind Mary's room, though powerful, is mistaken. Others still defend his original argument.
Worked example: Stereo Sue
Susan Barry, an American neurobiologist, was cross-eyed from early childhood. Because her eyes never worked together, she saw the world without stereoscopic depth, the vivid sense of space that comes from combining two slightly different views. She knew how stereo vision works and taught it to students. In her late forties, after a course of vision therapy trained her eyes to align, she began to see in stereo. The neurologist Oliver Sacks told her story in 2006. She described the steering wheel of her car seeming to float out in front of the dashboard, and falling snowflakes filling the space around her in layers.
Did Barry learn a new fact? She already knew the science. Most people agree something new happened to her. The ability hypothesis says she gained new skills of seeing and recognizing depth. The phenomenal concept strategy says she gained a new way of grasping brain processes she already understood. A dualist says she learned a nonphysical fact. Her case cannot settle the debate, because no one claims she knew all the physical facts. What it shows is that the gap between knowing about an experience and having it is real enough to change a life, and that each theory owes an account of what, exactly, was gained.
