The oldest answer to the puzzle of consciousness is that mind and matter are two different things. On this view the brain is a physical organ, but the experiencing self is not. The view, called dualism, has deep roots in religion and in ordinary talk of souls, and it also faces a famous problem.
Descartes's two substances
The French philosopher René Descartes gave dualism its classic form. In his Meditations of 1641 he argued that he could doubt the existence of his body but not of his own thinking, and that mind and body are two distinct substances. The mind is "a thing which thinks," with no size or shape. The body is extended in space and works like a machine. His key argument rested on conceivability: since he could clearly conceive of his mind existing without his body, the two must be distinct, at least in principle.
The interaction problem
In 1643 Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, then in her mid twenties, wrote to Descartes with a sharp question. In the physics of the day, one thing moved another by pushing it. How could a mind with no size, shape or surface push anything? How can an unextended soul move a physical body? Descartes suggested that the soul acts on the body through the pineal gland, a small structure deep in the brain, but this only moved the question to a smaller place.
Modern science has sharpened Elisabeth's point. Most physicists and philosophers accept the causal closure of the physical: every physical event that has a cause has a sufficient physical cause. Nerve signals that move your arm are caused by earlier nerve signals, chemical gradients and so on, and energy is conserved along the way. If that is right, a nonphysical mind seems to have no work left to do.
Property dualism
Most dualists today are not substance dualists. They accept that there is only one kind of stuff, the physical stuff that makes up brains and stars. But they hold that some of this stuff has properties that are not physical: experiential properties. This view is called property dualism: one kind of substance, but with both physical and nonphysical properties. Chalmers defends a version he calls naturalistic dualism, in which experience arises from physical systems according to laws of nature that science has not yet discovered.
Property dualism still faces the closure problem. One response is epiphenomenalism: experiences are caused by brain processes but cause nothing themselves. In an 1874 lecture Huxley compared consciousness to the steam whistle on a locomotive, which accompanies the engine's work but has no influence on it. The cost is high. If your pain causes nothing, then it is not your pain that makes you say "ouch," or makes you write a book about pain. Our very talk about experience would be produced by something other than experience.
The zombie argument
The strongest modern argument for dualism uses an odd character. A philosophical zombie is not a movie monster. It is a being physically identical to a normal person, atom for atom, but with no experience at all. It talks, laughs and flinches exactly as you do, yet inside it is dark. The philosopher Robert Kirk discussed such beings in 1974, and Chalmers made them famous in his 1996 book The Conscious Mind.
The argument runs in three steps. Zombies are conceivable: there is no contradiction in the idea. If they are conceivable, they are possible, at least in a broad sense. And if a world physically like ours could lack consciousness, then the physical facts alone do not fix the facts about consciousness, so physicalism is false.
Replies
Critics usually attack the second step. They point out that conceivability does not always track possibility. Before chemistry, people could seemingly conceive of water that was not made of hydrogen and oxygen. Yet water is H2O, and could not have been anything else. Perhaps zombies only seem conceivable because we are ignorant of how consciousness is physical. Defenders reply that the water case involves a hidden fact we could discover, while in the zombie case we already know all the physical facts by stipulation.
Worked example: your zombie twin writes an essay
Imagine your zombie twin, physically identical to you, in a world without experience. You both sit down to write an essay titled "Why I Am Sure I Am Conscious." Because your brains are the same, your fingers press the same keys. The zombie's essay is word for word the same as yours, full of confident claims about the redness of red and the ache of loss.
What follows? In the zombie, those words were produced entirely by physical processes, with no experience behind them. But your brain went through the same processes. So whatever caused your words would have caused them even without your experience. This puts the dualist in an awkward spot: the experience you are sure you are writing about seems to play no role in making you write about it. Chalmers calls this the paradox of phenomenal judgment and takes it seriously. Physicalists see it as a sign that the zombie scenario is confused from the start.
