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A thought experiment about lost science

Alasdair MacIntyre, a Scottish philosopher who spent most of his career in the United States, opened After Virtue (1981) with a strange story. Imagine that a public catastrophe destroys the natural sciences: laboratories burned, scientists killed, books scattered. Later, people try to revive science from what is left. They recite fragments of theories, use words like "neutrino" and "mass," and argue fiercely, but they have lost the background that once gave those words their meaning. This disquieting suggestion pictures a science surviving only in fragments after a disaster.

MacIntyre's claim was that our moral language is in the same condition. We use words like "virtue," "duty," "rights" and "justice," but they are fragments of older moral schemes, torn from the ways of life that made sense of them. That, he argued, is why modern moral arguments, about war, abortion or the distribution of wealth, never seem to end. Each side reasons validly from premises the other has no way to weigh.

The rise of emotivism

MacIntyre described the culture that results as emotivist. Emotivism is the view that moral claims express feelings or preferences, dressed up as statements of fact. He did not think emotivism was true as a theory of meaning, but he thought it described how moral talk now works in practice: as a contest of wills, in which each person tries to move others while claiming impartial authority. He traced this to the failure of what he called the Enlightenment project, the attempt to justify morality by reason alone, independent of any tradition or account of human purpose.

Practices and their goods

His positive answer began with the idea of a practice: a complex, cooperative human activity, such as chess, farming, medicine, music or the making of a family life, with its own standards of excellence. Practices offer two kinds of good. External goods, such as money, fame and power, can be got in many ways and are always someone's property. Internal goods are goods gained only by pursuing a practice's own excellence: the analytic skill and competitive imagination of good chess, the satisfaction of a well-turned piece of carpentry.

MacIntyre's example is a child who is paid in candy to play chess. At first the child may cheat, because so far the child cares only about the candy. If the child comes to value the goods internal to chess, cheating becomes pointless, since it defeats the very thing they want. Virtues, for MacIntyre, are the qualities that let us achieve internal goods: honesty, justice and courage among them.

Practices need institutions: hospitals, clubs, universities, orchestras. But institutions focus on external goods such as money, power and status, and they can corrupt the practices they house. A hospital that rewards billing over healing has turned the practice of medicine upside down.

Narrative and tradition

MacIntyre also argued that a human life has the unity of a story. I can only know what I should do if I know which stories I am part of: as a child of these parents, a citizen of this city, a member of this craft. And the stories are carried by traditions. A living tradition is an argument, extended through history, about the goods it serves. It is not frozen custom; it contains its own disputes and can learn from rivals.

His later book Dependent Rational Animals (1999) added a theme liberal theory often skips. It stressed human vulnerability and our need for one another's care, in infancy, illness, disability and old age. A good society, he argued, must honor the virtues of giving and of receiving without counting the cost.

Not a nationalist

MacIntyre rejected the communitarian label, partly because he doubted the modern nation-state could be the community that virtue needs. He once compared being asked to die for the modern state to being asked to die for the telephone company. His hopes lay with small, local communities of shared practice. Critics answered that his diagnosis was sweeping, that he gave too little guidance on which traditions are worth keeping, and that small communities can be stifling too. Feminist readers added that many traditions he admired had given women little part in their arguments, and others found his verdict on the Enlightenment unfair to thinkers who had rich views of virtue of their own.

Worked example: a local newspaper

Consider a town newspaper. Reporting is a practice: its internal goods include getting a story right, giving a voice to people who are not heard, and holding local officials to account. Its external goods are advertising revenue, prizes and readership. A new owner tells reporters to write whatever brings clicks. Circulation rises for a while.

MacIntyre's framework explains what has gone wrong more precisely than a complaint about profits. The institution has begun to serve only external goods, and the reporters who care about internal ones feel their work hollowed out. Honesty and courage, here, are not abstract rules but the qualities a good reporter needs to keep the practice alive under pressure.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. What does MacIntyre's disquieting suggestion imagine?
2. As MacIntyre uses the term, what is emotivism?
3. What are goods internal to a practice?
4. In MacIntyre's example, why might a child paid in candy cheat at chess?
5. According to MacIntyre, what do institutions tend to focus on?
6. How did MacIntyre describe a living tradition?
7. What did MacIntyre's Dependent Rational Animals stress?
8. Why did MacIntyre doubt the communitarian label applied to him?

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