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A war and two treaties

The Armenian Question was born at a peace conference. In 1877 Russia went to war with the Ottoman Empire, partly in the name of Balkan Christians, and its armies pushed deep into the Caucasus and the Balkans, taking the fortress of Kars. The Treaty of San Stefano, signed in March 1878, required the sultan to carry out reforms in the provinces where Armenians lived, and made Russian troops remaining in the region the guarantee that he would. Britain and Austria-Hungary feared that Russia would swallow the eastern provinces, so the great powers met in Berlin that summer to rewrite the settlement.

The result was Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, which required reforms and security for Armenians, overseen by the powers. The Ottoman government promised to improve conditions in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, to protect them against Kurdish and Circassian raids, and to report regularly to the powers on its progress. The Russian army withdrew. In its place stood a promise watched by six governments with very different interests, none of whom was prepared to enforce it.

The paper ladle

The Armenian delegation to Berlin was led by Mkrtich Khrimian, a former patriarch whom Armenians affectionately called Hayrik, little father. On his return he preached a famous sermon. At the congress, he said, a great pot of stew had been set out for the small nations. The Bulgarians, Serbs and Montenegrins had dipped in with iron ladles and come away fed. He had brought only a ladle made of paper, the petition he carried, and it had collapsed in the pot. His listeners understood him: petitions alone would not protect Armenians. A younger generation took the lesson to heart.

The revolutionary parties

Three Armenian parties formed in the following decade. The Armenakan party was founded in Van in 1885, mainly for local self-defense. The Hunchakian party was founded in Geneva in 1887 by Armenian students from Russia, and its socialist program called for an independent Armenia. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation, known as the Dashnaktsutyun or simply the Dashnaks, was founded in Tiflis in 1890 and at first sought autonomy and reform within the empire. Their members were few, their methods ranged from self-defense groups to propaganda and occasional assassinations, and most Armenians, including the patriarchate and the wealthy, kept their distance. But the parties gave the government a reason, or a pretext, to see conspiracy everywhere.

The sultan's response

Sultan Abdülhamid II, who reigned from 1876 to 1909, had watched Bulgaria break away after a revolt in 1876 and European intervention in 1878. He saw the Armenian Question as the next wedge that Europe would drive into his empire. He leaned on Islam as a bond of loyalty among his Muslim subjects and treated Armenian activism as treason. In 1891 he created the Hamidiye, irregular cavalry regiments recruited from Kurdish tribes and named after himself. Their chiefs received military rank and near immunity from ordinary courts. The regiments were meant to secure the frontier with Russia and bind Kurdish tribes to the throne, but in practice many used their new power to seize Armenian land and livestock and to settle scores with rival tribes.

Two fears

To understand the decades ahead, it helps to state each side's fear as its holders felt it. Ottoman statesmen had lost Greece, Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria, each time with European help, and to them Armenian reform looked like a step toward partition. Every European note about Armenians seemed to confirm that outsiders wanted a new Christian state carved from Anatolia. Armenians, for their part, saw reform as a matter of survival: they wanted courts that would hear them, taxes that followed the law, and protection from armed neighbors. Both fears were sincere. The tragedy lay in how the state answered a demand for protection: it treated the people asking for it as the danger.

Worked example: a promise with no enforcer

Read Article 61 as a lawyer would. It names a duty (reform and security), a beneficiary (Armenians in certain provinces) and an overseer (the powers acting together). It names no deadline, no inspector on the ground and no penalty for failure. Compare San Stefano, which tied reform to Russian troops who would leave only once it was done. San Stefano had teeth but served Russian ambition; Berlin had the approval of all the powers but no teeth at all.

Now ask what each party learned. The sultan learned that the powers would protest but not act, since Britain wanted the empire intact against Russia and Germany wanted Ottoman friendship. Armenian activists learned that only pressure, even violence, drew European attention. And Muslim neighbors in the east learned that Armenians were linked in foreign eyes to a project that might take their land. A promise meant to protect a vulnerable minority had instead made it look like a foreign cause while leaving it defenseless. Human rights pledges without anyone to enforce them can leave the people they name more exposed than before.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. What did Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin require?
2. Under the Treaty of San Stefano, what was to guarantee Armenian reforms?
3. What lesson did Khrimian Hayrik draw from the Congress of Berlin?
4. Where was the Hunchakian party founded in 1887?
5. Which party was founded in Van in 1885?
6. What was the Hamidiye?
7. What did Hamidiye chiefs receive?
8. Why did Ottoman statesmen fear Armenian reform?

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