In 1911 a young Austrian engineer turned up uninvited in Russell's rooms in Cambridge. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 to 1951) came from one of the richest families in Vienna, had studied engineering in Berlin and aeronautics in Manchester, and had become obsessed with the foundations of logic. Frege had advised him to study with Russell.
A book written at war
When war broke out in 1914, Wittgenstein volunteered for the Austro-Hungarian army. He served on the Eastern Front and in Italy, was decorated for bravery, and wrote philosophy in notebooks between battles. He finished his book in 1918 and was taken prisoner by the Italians shortly afterward. It appeared in German in 1921 and in English in 1922 as the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, with an introduction by Russell. It is short, about seventy pages, and made of numbered remarks.
The first lines set the tone: "The world is everything that is the case. The world is the totality of facts, not of things." On this view the world is the totality of facts, not of things. A chair is a thing; the chair's being next to the table is a fact. The world is made of how things stand, and language exists to say how they stand.
The picture theory
How can a sentence say anything about the world? Wittgenstein's answer is the picture theory of meaning. A proposition represents a possible fact by sharing its logical form, the way a map shares a structure with the land it maps. The names in a sentence stand for objects, and the way the names are arranged shows how the objects are arranged, if the sentence is true. A sentence makes sense if it pictures a possible situation; it is true if that situation obtains.
The idea is said to have come to him during the war, when he read about a Paris court that used model cars and dolls to reconstruct a traffic accident. The models could represent the accident because their arrangement mirrored the arrangement of the real vehicles and people.
What logic says
Complex sentences are built from simple ones by words such as "and," "or" and "not," and their truth depends entirely on the truth of their parts. The Tractatus helped make standard truth tables, the grids that show for every combination of true and false parts whether the whole is true. A striking consequence follows. Some sentences, such as "it is raining or it is not raining," come out true in every row. Tautologies are true in every case and so say nothing about the world.
Saying and showing
The Tractatus draws a line between what can be said and what can only be shown. Logical form cannot itself be pictured, because any picture would already use it; it shows itself in the sentences we use. Further, since meaningful sentences picture facts, ethics, beauty and the meaning of life lie beyond what can be said, though they may show themselves. As he put it, "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world." This was not a dismissal of ethics. Wittgenstein told a publisher that the point of his book was ethical, and that its most important part was the part he had not written.
The book then turns on itself. Its own sentences are not pictures of facts, so by its own standard they are nonsense. Wittgenstein accepted this. The reader who understands him, he wrote, "must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it." The reader should use the book's propositions to climb beyond them and then discard them, seeing the world rightly.
Leaving philosophy
Wittgenstein believed he had solved the problems of philosophy, so he stopped doing it. He gave away his share of the family fortune and taught in village schools in rural Austria from 1920 to 1926. Only in 1929 did he return to Cambridge, where the Tractatus was accepted as his doctoral thesis, with Russell and Moore as examiners. He had begun to suspect that the book was badly wrong.
Worked example: the scale model
An architect presents a city council with a scale model of a proposed apartment block. The model has a little tower, a courtyard and a row of trees along the street. Council members can read things from the model that no one said aloud: that the courtyard gets afternoon sun, that the tower overshadows the school across the road. The model can do this because the arrangement of its pieces matches the arrangement the real buildings would have.
That is the picture theory in miniature. The model has a sense, a possible situation it shows, before anyone knows whether it will be built; whether it is true depends on the world. Notice, too, what the model cannot show: whether the block is worth building, whether the school's pupils deserve their sunlight. Those questions are real, and people can show what they value in how they decide. But for the early Wittgenstein they were not facts that a model, or a sentence, could picture.
