The war on the village
At the end of 1929 Stalin announced that the kulaks, the supposedly rich peasants, would be eliminated as a class. Over the following winter, party activists, police and thousands of urban volunteers descended on the villages to drive peasants into collective farms. A collective farm, or kolkhoz, pooled land, animals and tools and delivered a fixed share of its harvest to the state.
The word kulak was elastic. It could mean a peasant who owned two cows or hired a laborer at harvest, and it was soon stretched to cover anyone who resisted, who could be branded a kulak henchman. The process called dekulakization sorted victims into three categories. The first were shot or sent to camps; the second were deported with their families to remote regions; the third were resettled on poor land in their own district. In 1930 and 1931 alone, about 1.8 million people were deported as "special settlers" to the northern forests, the Urals, Siberia and Kazakhstan, often in freight cars, and many were left to build their own shelters.
Resistance and retreat
Peasants resisted with the weapons they had. Rather than hand over their animals, many slaughtered their livestock, ate what they could and sold the rest. Between 1928 and 1933 the number of horses and cattle in the country fell by roughly half, a blow to farming that lasted for years. Riots broke out across the countryside, many led by women, who expected harsher punishments to fall on men.
In March 1930 Stalin published an article called "Dizzy with Success". In it he blamed local officials for going too far, as if the violence had been their idea. Peasants took the hint and left the farms in large numbers. The pause was brief. Within months the drive resumed, and by the mid 1930s nearly all peasant households had been collectivized.
Famine, 1932 to 1933
The harvest of 1932 was poor, but the state demanded high deliveries anyway, and it went on exporting more than a million tons of grain a year. A law of 7 August 1932 imposed long camp terms or death for theft of collective farm property, which included gleaning a few ears of grain from the fields after harvest. People called it the law of spikelets. Villages that missed their quotas were blacklisted and cut off from manufactured goods.
Ukraine and the Kuban region of the North Caucasus, which had many Ukrainian inhabitants, were treated with special severity. A directive of 22 January 1933 stopped peasants from leaving Ukraine and the Kuban in search of food. At the same time the regime ended the policy of promoting Ukrainian culture in the Kuban and launched a purge of the Ukrainian Communist Party.
Deaths are still debated. Most estimates for the whole Soviet Union fall between about 5.5 and 8.7 million, and most estimates for Ukraine fall between about 3.5 and 5 million. In Ukraine the famine is called the Holodomor, a word meaning death by hunger. In Kazakhstan, where nomads were forced to settle and their herds were seized, about 1.5 million people died, a larger share of the population than anywhere else. The government denied that any famine existed and turned away foreign aid. When the census of 1937 counted millions fewer people than expected, its results were suppressed and its organizers were arrested.
Was it genocide?
Ukraine's parliament declared the Holodomor a genocide in 2006, and many other countries, including Canada, Poland and Germany, have recognized it as such. Historians such as Robert Conquest and Anne Applebaum stress the measures aimed specifically at Ukraine: the border closure, the blacklists and the simultaneous attack on Ukrainian national life. Others, notably R. W. Davies and Stephen Wheatcroft, argue that Stalin's policies caused the famine but the evidence does not show an intent to destroy Ukrainians as a nation, and they point out that Kazakhstan and the Volga also suffered terribly. Some scholars take a middle position: a famine produced by policy across the union, turned deliberately harsher in Ukraine once it began. Nearly everyone agrees on the core facts: the famine was man-made, the regime knew of it, and it chose grain targets over lives.
Worked example: two reporters in 1933
In March 1933 a young Welsh journalist, Gareth Jones, slipped off a train and walked through villages in the Kharkiv region. He heard people saying there was no bread and saw swollen children and fresh graves. Back in Berlin he told reporters that a great famine was under way. Within days, Walter Duranty of the New York Times, who had won a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting from Moscow, wrote a reply that admitted hunger and disease but dismissed talk of famine. Privately, according to a British diplomat, Duranty estimated that millions had died.
How do we judge such sources? Jones had walked the ground and recorded what he saw, but he spent only days there. Duranty had long experience and good access, but that access depended on staying on good terms with the regime, which barred most correspondents from the famine zones. The lesson is not that the outsider is always right. It is to ask what each witness could see, what each had to lose, and whether the account fits other evidence. Here, Soviet archives opened after 1991 confirmed Jones.
