In its first eight years the People's Republic achieved things no Chinese government had managed in a century. It ended inflation, unified the mainland, fought the world's strongest military to a standstill in Korea, and began to industrialize. It did so through mass campaigns that killed and terrified millions. Both halves of that sentence are true, and the period cannot be understood without holding them together.
Land reform
The Communists had promised the land to those who worked it, and in 1950 a land reform law extended to the whole country what they had begun in the north. Work teams arrived in each village, classified every household as landlord, rich peasant, middle peasant or poor peasant, and called mass meetings at which tenants were urged to accuse their landlords. Land, tools and animals were seized and handed out. Land reform redistributed land through village meetings that denounced landlords, and many of those accused were beaten or shot. Estimates of the dead range widely, commonly from about one million to two million or more. The campaign destroyed the old rural elite and tied the poor to the new state, which had given them land and made them complicit in violence. Within a few years, the same farmers would be asked to give the land up again.
New laws for families
One of the regime's first major laws concerned marriage. The Marriage Law of 1950 banned arranged marriage and allowed women to seek divorce. It also outlawed concubinage, child betrothal and the sale of brides. A wave of divorce suits followed, most brought by women, and in some places husbands and in-laws answered with violence. For many women it was a real liberation, and it carried forward the hopes of the May Fourth generation.
War and campaigns
In October 1950, as American-led United Nations forces pushed toward the Chinese border in Korea, hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops, called the People's Volunteers, crossed the Yalu River. The war killed several hundred thousand Chinese soldiers, Mao's own son among them, but it showed that China could stand up to the United States. At home it justified a hunt for enemies. A campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries in 1950 and 1951 executed hundreds of thousands, and campaigns in 1951 and 1952 targeted corrupt officials and then private business owners.
The new state also reached its borderlands. The People's Liberation Army entered Tibet in 1950, and an agreement signed in 1951 promised Tibetan autonomy under Chinese rule. Tensions grew, and after a failed uprising in 1959 the Dalai Lama fled to India, where he set up a government in exile.
Following the Soviet model
China signed a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union in 1950, and Soviet loans, plans and thousands of advisers shaped its economy. The First Five-Year Plan of 1953 to 1957 put heavy industry first, building steel mills, power plants and machine works, and industrial output grew fast. In the countryside, families who had just received land were pushed into cooperatives in 1955 and 1956, far faster than even many party leaders expected. By 1956 private business in the cities had also been taken over by the state.
A hundred flowers
In 1956 Mao invited criticism. The slogan called for a hundred flowers to bloom and a hundred schools of thought to contend, borrowing an image from the classical age of rival philosophers. Intellectuals were wary at first. In the spring of 1957, after further encouragement, they spoke, and the flood surprised everyone. Students put up posters at Peking University, where a young woman named Lin Xiling drew crowds with speeches against privilege and was later imprisoned for years, and critics attacked the party's monopoly on power, abuses by officials and the treatment of intellectuals. Within weeks the party struck back. The Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957 labeled about 550,000 people rightists, the official figure, and many spent two decades in labor camps or rural exile. Deng Xiaoping was among the leaders who directed it. Few would speak freely again in Mao's lifetime.
Worked example: Trap or mistake?
Did Mao plan the Hundred Flowers as a trap? The case for a trap rests partly on Mao's own words. After the crackdown began, he described it as luring snakes out of their holes, and party documents from June 1957 speak of letting critics expose themselves. The case for a mistake comes from historians such as Roderick MacFarquhar, who traced Mao's speeches in early 1957 and argued that Mao was sincere but shocked by the criticism: confident that the revolution was popular, Mao expected mild complaints about bureaucrats and instead heard attacks on the party itself. On this view the snakes remark was a cover story to hide misjudgment. Notice that both readings lead to the same lesson for a citizen. A government that alone decides when criticism is allowed, and that can punish critics afterward, has not granted freedom of speech. It has only granted a pause.
