In 1958 Mao Zedong set out to make China a modern industrial power in a few years rather than a few decades. The result was the deadliest famine in recorded history. It was not caused by war or by a single failed harvest. It came from policy, from fear inside a political system, and from a refusal to change course once the evidence was plain.
The leap
By 1957 Mao had grown impatient with the slow, Soviet style of planning. He believed that the energy of hundreds of millions of mobilized people could substitute for capital and machines. China, he announced, would overtake Britain in steel output within fifteen years, and the target was soon shortened. The plan was called the Great Leap Forward. Across the countryside, families were organized into vast people's communes. By the end of 1958 some 26,000 people's communes had absorbed the cooperatives, each averaging about five thousand households. Private plots were abolished, and in many places pots and pans were taken for steel. Communal mess halls replaced family kitchens, where at first people were told to eat their fill for free.
Peasants were also pulled away from the fields. Tens of millions were sent to dig irrigation works or to tend backyard furnaces, small clay or brick kilns meant to produce steel in every village. Wood, doors and furniture fed the fires. Most backyard furnace iron was too poor in quality to use, and meanwhile crops rotted unharvested in the fields. Pseudoscientific farming methods spread with official blessing: plowing very deep and planting seeds very close together, which lowered yields rather than raising them.
Hunger
Local officials competed to report record harvests, and the state took grain according to those reports. By the winter of 1958 to 1959 hunger was spreading. Some officials tied people up, beat them, or denied food to families who were accused of hiding grain. China went on exporting grain in 1959 and 1960, partly to repay debts to the Soviet Union, while its own villages starved. The household registration system, or hukou, made the trap tighter. Hukou rules tied rural people to their villages, so peasants could not legally move to cities, where rations, though meager, were more secure. In Xinyang prefecture in Henan, one of the worst-hit areas, officials stopped villagers from leaving to beg for food, and an estimated one million people died there.
Lushan: the moment to stop
In July 1959 party leaders met at the mountain resort of Lushan. Defense Minister Peng Dehuai, a veteran commander who had seen hunger in his home province, wrote Mao a private letter warning about exaggeration and waste. Mao read the letter out as an attack on him. Peng Dehuai was purged after he criticized the Leap at Lushan, and a new campaign against "right opportunists" followed. Officials who had doubts now had every reason to keep them quiet, and the requisitions grew harsher. The worst deaths came after Lushan, in 1959 to 1961.
The Soviet Union, increasingly at odds with Mao over ideology and leadership of world communism, withdrew its advisers in 1960. By 1961 the leadership retreated: mess halls closed, private plots returned, and food was imported. At a large party conference in early 1962, the head of state Liu Shaoqi said the disaster had been three parts natural and seven parts man-made. Mao stepped back from daily management, and he did not forget who had criticized him.
How many died?
No official count exists. Most scholarly estimates of excess deaths fall between about 15 million and 45 million, and many demographers estimate around 30 million excess deaths. The journalist Yang Jisheng, a party member whose own father starved, put the figure near 36 million in his book Tombstone, and the historian Frank Dikötter argued for at least 45 million. In China, the famine is described officially as the three years of difficulty, and serious public research on it remains restricted.
Worked example: Counting deaths that were never recorded
How can anyone estimate a death toll that no one counted? Demographers use excess mortality: deaths beyond what would have been expected in normal years. Take China's own published figures. In 1957 the official death rate was about 11 per thousand people. In 1960 it was about 25 per thousand. The difference, about 14 per thousand, multiplied by a population of roughly 660 million, gives some 9 million excess deaths in that single year, using figures the government itself released. Then come corrections. Deaths were underreported during the crisis, so demographers compare the censuses of 1953, 1964 and 1982 to find people who should have been alive and were not. They must also separate excess deaths from births that never happened because starving women stopped conceiving, which are a real loss but a different one. Choices made at each step explain why honest scholars reach different totals. All the serious estimates, however, put it in the tens of millions.
