A system with a hole in it
Within a decade of the first Critique, young German philosophers were sure Kant had started a revolution and equally sure he had not finished it. The weak point, as they saw it, was the thing in itself. The writer Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi put it neatly in 1787: without that assumption he could not enter Kant's system, and with it he could not stay inside. If the categories apply only to appearances, how can unknowable things cause our sensations? Kant's heirs set out to build a philosophy with no such gap. The result was German idealism, concentrated in a few small university towns, above all Jena.
Fichte and the striving I
Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762 to 1814) was a poor weaver's son whose career began with a lucky accident. In 1792 his first book, a critique of revelation, appeared without his name, and readers took it for a work by Kant. When Kant corrected the error and praised the author, Fichte became famous overnight and soon held a chair at Jena.
Fichte dropped the unknowable thing in itself. Philosophy, he argued, must begin from a single principle, and the only candidate is the activity of the self, which he called the I. In his Science of Knowledge (1794), the I "posits itself": it exists in and through its own act of self-awareness. But an I with nothing opposed to it could not act or know anything, so the I also posits a not-I, a world to serve as a limit it can strive against. The world, for Fichte, is above all the stage and material for our moral effort. Practical reason, not theory, comes first. He even remarked that the kind of philosophy a person chooses depends on the kind of person they are.
Fichte drew a political lesson. In his Foundations of Natural Right (1796) he argued that I can become conscious of myself as free only by being summoned by another free being, who addresses me as someone able to respond. Freedom is born between persons. Rights, on this view, rest on mutual recognition: I must limit my freedom so that others have room for theirs.
Fichte's career was stormy. Accused of atheism for an essay identifying God with the moral order of the world, he lost his Jena post in 1799 after a dispute over charges of atheism. That same year Kant publicly disowned his system. Later, in Berlin under French occupation, Fichte gave his Addresses to the German Nation (1807 to 1808), calling for national renewal through education. They became a founding text of German nationalism, and later nationalists used them in ways that sit uneasily beside his universal ethics of freedom.
Schelling and living nature
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775 to 1854) was a prodigy. At the Protestant seminary in Tübingen he shared rooms with Hegel and the poet Friedrich Hölderlin, and he became a professor at Jena at twenty-three. Fichte's world seemed to Schelling too thin: nature was reduced to an obstacle for the I. But nature produced the I in the first place.
His philosophy of nature treated nature as productive and alive, akin to spirit: a system of forces and polarities, from magnetism and electricity to plant growth and animal life, rising toward consciousness. In one formula, nature is visible spirit and spirit is invisible nature. In his System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) Schelling crowned the whole with art, where conscious design and unconscious genius meet, and called it the true organ of philosophy. These ideas fed the Romantic circle in Jena around the Schlegel brothers and the poet Novalis.
Schelling's next step was a philosophy of identity: at the deepest level, subject and object, mind and nature, are one absolute. His old friend Hegel thought this too easy. In the preface to his Phenomenology of 1807 he mocked an absolute in which all differences vanish as a night in which all cows are black. The friendship never recovered. Decades later, in 1841, Schelling was called to Berlin to lecture against Hegel's influence, before an audience that included the young Kierkegaard and Friedrich Engels.
Worked example: Ørsted's compass needle
In 1820 the Danish physicist Hans Christian Ørsted noticed that a compass needle moved when an electric current flowed through a nearby wire. It was the first clear evidence that electricity and magnetism are connected.
Ørsted had read Kant closely and had studied the philosophy of nature. Many historians argue that its conviction that nature's forces are polar expressions of a single underlying activity led him to look for the link that more cautious physicists had dismissed. How large that influence was is debated, and Ørsted himself later criticized Schelling's speculative excesses.
The case is a fair test of Schelling's legacy. Speculative philosophy of nature produced plenty of dead ends and fanciful analogies. But a big unifying idea can tell an experimenter where to look. What it cannot do is replace the needle. Ørsted's discovery counted because the compass moved in front of witnesses, not because a system said it must.
