The Gilded Age economy grew enormously, but it did not grow smoothly. It lurched from boom to bust and back again, and two of its busts were among the worst in American history. Understanding why they happened, and how people tried to respond, explains a good deal about the anger and the political experiments of the period.
The Panic of 1873
Railroad building ran on borrowed money. Promoters sold bonds to investors at home and in Europe, built lines ahead of demand, and hoped traffic and land sales would follow. Jay Cooke, a Philadelphia banker who had become famous selling Union war bonds, staked his firm on the Northern Pacific, a planned line from Lake Superior to the Pacific Northwest. Investors grew wary, the bonds stopped selling, and on 18 September 1873 the collapse of Jay Cooke and Company, a railroad bond house, set off the Panic of 1873. Other banks and brokers followed it down. Two days later the New York Stock Exchange closed its doors, and it stayed closed for ten days.
What followed was a long, grinding slump. Railroads went bankrupt, building stopped and wages were cut again and again. The National Bureau of Economic Research, which dates American business cycles, records the downturn that began in 1873 as its longest contraction, lasting about 65 months, to March 1879. Some economists point out that total output kept growing for much of that time while prices fell, so the period was gentler in some measures than its reputation. For a worker whose pay was cut by a third, or a family that lost its house, that distinction offered little comfort.
A system with no shock absorber
Why were panics so frequent? Part of the answer lies in how money moved. The United States had no central bank. Under the national banking laws passed during the Civil War, small country banks could hold part of their reserves as deposits in city banks, and city banks could hold theirs in New York. Bankers called this a reserve pyramid. It worked in quiet times, but each autumn country banks pulled reserves home to pay for moving the harvest, and money grew tight in New York just when it was needed most. A single large failure in a tight season could set off runs all down the pyramid.
The Panic of 1893
The next great crash began early in 1893, when the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad failed, followed by the National Cordage Company, a rope trust that had been a favorite of speculators. Hundreds of banks closed and thousands of businesses failed. Railroads controlling a large share of the nation's track passed into the hands of court appointed receivers. Joblessness rose sharply, but how sharply is still argued. Estimates of unemployment in the mid 1890s differ widely because no official count existed, so historians rebuild the figures using different methods, and their results range from around 12 to over 18 percent of the labor force.
Out of the depression came a new kind of protest. Jacob Coxey, a quarry owner from Massillon, Ohio, set out on foot for Washington in March 1894 with a small band of followers who called themselves the Commonweal of Christ. Newspapers named them Coxey's Army. They demanded that the federal government hire the unemployed to build roads, paid for with new paper money. Only a few hundred marchers reached the capital. On 1 May 1894 Coxey was arrested for walking on the grass of the Capitol grounds, and the march dissolved. Yet the idea that Washington should create jobs in a slump, which seemed outlandish to most officials in 1894, would return with great force a few decades later.
Bankers to the rescue?
The depression also drained the federal Treasury's gold. People and banks traded paper money for gold, fearing the government would abandon the gold standard, and the reserve fell toward a point where the Treasury might default on its promise to pay in gold. In February 1895 President Grover Cleveland turned to the banker J. P. Morgan and to August Belmont, the American agent of the Rothschild bank. Their syndicate supplied gold to the Treasury in exchange for government bonds, and promised to use its influence to stop gold from flowing abroad. The run eased. Morgan's firm also took over bankrupt railroads and reorganized them, cutting their debts and putting bankers on their boards, a process critics called Morganization.
Worked example: rescue or sellout?
Weigh the 1895 gold deal as Americans did at the time. Its defenders made a strong case: the Treasury was days from crisis, Congress would not act, and a private syndicate stopped a panic that could have deepened the depression. Its critics made a strong case too. The syndicate bought the bonds at a price that let it resell them at a handsome profit, and an elected government had been forced to bargain with a handful of bankers on their terms. Farmers who owed money and wanted more currency in circulation saw proof that the gold standard served creditors. Both sides were describing something real. The episode left a question that the next generation answered by creating a central bank: who should hold the power to stop a panic, and to whom should that power answer?
