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Most moral thinking assumes that the people affected by a choice already exist, or at least will exist whatever we decide. Choices that stretch across generations break that assumption, and philosophers have found the result surprisingly hard to untangle.

The non-identity problem

In Reasons and Persons (1984), the British philosopher Derek Parfit noticed something odd about long-run decisions. Who gets born depends on extremely fine details of timing: which couple meets, when, and which of millions of possible conceptions actually happens. A major policy, such as building a highway or changing an energy system, alters millions of daily routines, and within a few generations it changes which particular people exist. The non-identity problem is that a policy can make future lives worse without making any particular future person worse off, because without the policy those people would never have been born.

Parfit illustrated it with a choice between depletion and conservation. Suppose a society can use up a resource quickly, raising living standards for the next two centuries but lowering them for people after that, or it can conserve. The people living three centuries later under depletion would not exist under the conservation policy, so if their lives are still worth living, it seems no one has been harmed. Yet nearly everyone feels depletion would be wrong.

Ways out

Parfit's own response was to give up the idea that every wrong must be a wrong to someone in particular. Parfit concluded that it can be wrong to bring about a worse outcome even if no particular person is worse off. On this impersonal view, depletion is wrong because it makes the future go worse than it could have gone. Parfit admitted he had not found a full theory that handled every case.

Others take a rights-based path. Whoever the future people turn out to be, they will have the same basic rights as anyone else once they exist. A threshold view holds that we owe future people, whoever they are, conditions good enough for a decent life: clean water, a livable climate, working institutions. This fits naturally with the conviction that every person has equal worth regardless of when they are born. Its critics say it tells us little about what we owe beyond the minimum.

Rawls and just savings

The American philosopher John Rawls faced the same question in A Theory of Justice (1971). His famous device asks people to choose principles of justice from behind a veil of ignorance that hides their place in society. For questions across time, he added that the parties do not know which generation they belong to. Rawls's just savings principle asks each generation to save enough to establish and keep just institutions, after which heavy saving is no longer required. The aim is a just society, not ever-growing wealth. Critics ask whether this demands too little in a world facing climate change, where keeping just institutions may itself require large investments.

Can we owe people who cannot repay us?

Some theories of justice rest on reciprocity: we owe fairness to those who cooperate with us for mutual benefit. Future people can do nothing for us. The reciprocity objection says that duties of justice need mutual benefit, which future people cannot provide. A common reply points to the chain of overlapping lives. Each generation received roads, knowledge, languages and laws from those before it, and repays that debt the only way it can, by passing on as much to those after it. This reply treats justice between generations as indirect reciprocity: we repay our predecessors by giving to our successors.

The German-born philosopher Hans Jonas argued in The Imperative of Responsibility (1979) that modern technology has changed ethics itself. Traditional morality dealt with neighbors and short time spans because human action rarely reached further. Now human power reaches across centuries and could even end human life on Earth. Jonas argued that because technology extends the reach of human action, responsibility must extend just as far, and he urged giving extra weight to the worst predictions when the stakes are irreversible.

Worked example: Nauru's phosphate

The Pacific island of Nauru was once covered in rich phosphate deposits, mined first under colonial rule and then, after independence in 1968, by the Nauruan government. For a time in the 1970s Nauruans had one of the highest incomes per person in the world. Mining stripped most of the island's interior down to jagged coral pinnacles, and a trust fund meant to support future Nauruans was badly invested and largely lost. By the early 2000s the deposits were nearly exhausted and the country was in financial crisis. This is close to Parfit's depletion case in real life. The Nauruans born after the boom are not the same people who would have been born under a slower path, so a view that counts only harms to particular people struggles to call the choice a harm to them. The impersonal view says the outcome is simply worse than it needed to be. The threshold view asks whether later Nauruans were left the basics of a decent life, and the honest answer is only partly. Rawls would point to the failure to save: a passing windfall was never turned into lasting institutions.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. What is the non-identity problem?
2. In Parfit's depletion case, why does no one seem to be harmed?
3. What did Parfit conclude about the non-identity problem?
4. What does a threshold view say we owe future people?
5. What does Rawls's just savings principle ask of each generation?
6. What does the reciprocity objection claim?
7. How does the indirect reciprocity reply answer that objection?
8. What did Hans Jonas argue about technology and ethics?

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