Skip to main content

Some of the deepest objections to effective altruism were made before the movement existed. They were aimed at utilitarianism, and they ask whether a life organized around producing the best outcomes is a life a person could recognize as their own.

George and Jim

In Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973), a short book shared with the Australian utilitarian J. J. C. Smart, the English philosopher Bernard Williams set out two cases. In the first, George is a chemist offered work at a laboratory researching chemical and biological weapons. He is opposed to such weapons, but he needs the job to support his family, and if he refuses, the post will go to someone who will pursue the research with enthusiasm. A utilitarian seems bound to say George should take it.

In the second case, Jim is traveling in a remote town where an army captain is about to shoot twenty captured villagers. The captain offers Jim a deal: if Jim shoots one of them himself, the other nineteen will go free. Williams thought utilitarianism might well give the right answer here, but he objected that it gives the answer too easily, as though Jim's own act of killing were simply one more event in the world.

Williams's George case closely resembles the replaceability argument behind earning to give: if George refuses, someone else will do the job anyway, so his refusal seems to make no difference to the outcome.

Integrity

Williams's central complaint concerned integrity, in the old sense of wholeness. Each of us has projects and commitments that give our life its shape: a vocation, a cause, a marriage. Utilitarianism treats these as one input among others, to be dropped whenever the sums come out differently. Williams's integrity objection says utilitarianism alienates people from their own deepest projects and commitments, turning each person into a channel through which the best outcome flows.

He added a point about agency. Williams held that we bear a special responsibility for what we ourselves do, not only for how things turn out. There is a moral difference, on his view, between George building weapons and George failing to prevent someone else from building them.

A thought too many

In a 1976 essay, Williams offered a case that echoes Singer's pond. A man sees his wife and a stranger both drowning and can save only one. Some philosophers had argued that he may save his wife because impartial morality permits favoring loved ones in such cases. Williams found this absurd. Williams argued that a man who saves his drowning wife should not need an impartial justification first. If he stops to check that morality allows it, he has already reasoned in the wrong way.

Moral saints

The American philosopher Susan Wolf extended the point in a 1982 essay, "Moral Saints." Imagine a person whose every action aims at making others as well off as possible. Such a person would have no time for playing the cello, reading novels for pleasure or cultivating a dry sense of humor, except where these helped others. Wolf argued that a life devoted wholly to doing the most good would not be an ideal life for a person.

Partiality

Behind these arguments stands a broader view. Partialists hold that special relationships create real duties, not mere permissions. Parents owe things to their children, friends to friends and citizens to one another that they do not owe to strangers. On this view, impartiality is the right attitude for some roles, such as a judge or a public official, but not for a whole human life.

The movement's replies

Effective altruists have answered in several ways. Many reply that their view asks people to do good effectively with some of their resources, not to maximize in every choice. The 10 percent pledge leaves ninety percent of a life untouched. Nothing in the movement asks the man to let his wife drown.

They add that helping strangers can itself be a deep project, as central to a person's integrity as any other. And they point out that Williams's arguments, if they prove anything, prove too much: few people think integrity excuses ignoring a drowning child when no one else is near.

Critics reply that the movement's culture, with its talk of optimizing careers and comparing friendships with donations, often sounds more demanding than its official doctrine.

Worked example: the nurse who loves her work

Mara is a pediatric nurse in a city hospital. She gives 10 percent of her pay to malaria charities and volunteers at a local shelter. A friend in the movement points out that if she retrained as a software engineer, she could give three times as much.

A Williams-inspired reply says nursing is Mara's project, the thing that makes her life hers, and that treating it as a resource to be reallocated misunderstands what a person is. Wolf would add that her life already has a richness a moral saint's would lack. The effective altruist can agree in part: personal fit matters, burnout is costly, and a contented nurse who gives for forty years may do more good than a miserable engineer who quits after five. Where they still disagree is over whether those considerations count because they produce good outcomes, or because Mara's life belongs to her.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. What does Williams's integrity objection claim?
2. What work is George offered in Williams's case?
3. Which argument does Williams's George case closely resemble?
4. What responsibility did Williams stress?
5. What did Williams say about a man saving his drowning wife?
6. What did Wolf argue about a life devoted wholly to doing the most good?
7. What do partialists hold?
8. How do many effective altruists reply to integrity objections?

CivilSimian.com created by AxiomaticPanic, CivilSimian, Kalokagathia