No idea in political philosophy goes long without opponents, and the capabilities approach has attracted serious ones. Some defend older standards of justice. Others accept the spirit of the approach but doubt it can do what its champions claim. Weighing them is the best way to see what the approach offers and what it still owes.
The resourcist reply
The most direct challenge comes from resourcists, who hold that justice should distribute resources or all-purpose means and leave people to turn them into lives as they see fit. Rawls replied to Sen in his later work. Primary goods, he argued, have a great advantage: they are public and measurable for all citizens, so people can check whether they are being treated fairly without first agreeing on what makes a life go well. A capability metric, by contrast, requires judgments about which doings and beings matter, the sort of judgments people in a free society will never fully share. Rawls added that his index of primary goods already took some account of citizens' differing needs, and that special needs arising from illness or disability could be met at the legislative stage.
Capability theorists answer that public measurability bought at the price of ignoring real differences is a poor bargain.
Pogge's challenge
The German philosopher Thomas Pogge, a former student of Rawls, pressed a sharper objection in a 2002 essay, Can the Capability Approach Be Justified? To justify giving extra help to someone with an impairment, Pogge argued, a capability theorist must judge that this person's natural endowments are worse than other people's. Ranking people's natural endowments in this way, he held, is disrespectful: it can stigmatize those judged worse off. A resourcist, he suggested, can meet special needs without passing such judgments, by asking how social institutions treat people and whether they produce or tolerate avoidable disadvantage. On his view, justice is mainly about how institutions treat people, not about correcting nature's lottery.
Defenders reply that recognizing that a person cannot walk is not a judgment that the person is inferior. It is a fact about what they need, which Pogge's own resourcism must also notice if it is to supply wheelchairs.
Other objections
A further set of objections concerns practice. Capabilities describe what a person could do, and so are hard to observe; most studies end up measuring functionings. The approach can also demand vast information, since an agency that wants to know every person's real freedoms faces a task far beyond counting incomes. Critics on the left argue that it focuses on individuals and can miss power. The economist Frances Stewart argued that groups and structures also shape capabilities, and that collective action is often how they expand. Libertarian critics worry that such a state may grow intrusive and costly.
Allies in philosophy
The approach has also gained allies. The American philosopher Elizabeth Anderson, in her 1999 essay What Is the Point of Equality?, argued that egalitarians should stop focusing on compensating people for bad luck and aim instead at a society of equals. Her democratic equality asks for what one needs to function as an equal citizen: being able to move about in public, speak and be heard, and work without domination. Her view makes equality a matter of how people stand toward one another.
Sen's comparative turn
In The Idea of Justice (2009), dedicated to the memory of Rawls, Sen argued that political philosophy had spent too long describing a perfectly just society. Instead Sen urged comparing real options to cut clear injustices. He illustrated the plurality of reasons with three children quarreling over a flute: one is the only one who can play it, another is so poor as to have no toys at all, and the third made the flute by hand. Several serious principles can conflict here, and no single theory settles the case beyond dispute. We can still agree, Sen argued, that abolishing slavery or ending legal discrimination is an improvement without first agreeing on the ideal.
What the approach has changed
Whatever its unsettled questions, the approach has reshaped practice. Development agencies report human development alongside income, poverty is measured in many dimensions, and disability policy speaks of barriers and support, not only of medical defects. Its deepest claim is simple: judge a society by what its people can do and be. It asks every citizen to look past averages to individual lives.
Worked example: one budget, two proposals
A regional government has money for one program. Proposal one gives every low-income household an equal cash grant. Proposal two spends the same sum on accessible buses, home care for elderly and disabled residents, and literacy classes for women. A resourcist in the spirit of Rawls would note that the cash grant is simple, public and respects each household's choices, and that it avoids the government deciding which lives need what. A capability theorist would ask what the cash can buy: for a wheelchair user with no accessible bus, an extra grant may change little. Pogge would warn against framing proposal two as help for the less endowed and would ask instead how existing transport and schooling arrangements shut people out. Sen would counsel comparing the two proposals for the clearest reductions in deprivation, rather than waiting for an ideal scheme.
