Social contract theories, from Thomas Hobbes and John Locke to John Rawls, picture a just society as an agreement among people who expect to gain from cooperating. In Frontiers of Justice (2006), Nussbaum argued that this picture, for all its power, leaves out three groups. She named disability, nationality and other species as the three unsolved problems of social contract theory, and offered the capabilities approach as a better starting point for all three.
The contract and its assumptions
Contract theories, Nussbaum argued, make two linked assumptions. The parties are roughly equal in power, so none can dominate the rest. David Hume had described this rough equality as one of the circumstances that make justice both possible and necessary. And the parties cooperate for mutual advantage: each accepts the rules because each expects to be better off. Rawls, the most humane of contract thinkers, still designed his principles for citizens who are fully cooperating members of society over a complete life, and he set aside severe physical and mental impairments as problems to be handled later, once the basic principles were fixed.
Nussbaum's complaint is that people with severe disabilities then enter the theory late, as objects of charity, rather than as citizens for whom justice is designed in the first place. Tying justice to mutual advantage, she argued, makes dignity seem a reward for productivity, when on her view dignity belongs to a person simply as a human being.
Three lives
Nussbaum wrote about real people. One was Sesha, the daughter of the philosopher Eva Kittay, who has severe cognitive and physical disabilities and will always need care. Another was Jamie, the son of the literary scholar Michael Bérubé, who has Down syndrome. The third was Nussbaum's own nephew Arthur, who has Asperger syndrome and Tourette syndrome. Each, she argued, should be supported to reach the threshold as far as possible.
Kittay also stressed that someone has to do the caring. What she called dependency work, caring for those unable to care for themselves, falls mostly on women and is mostly unpaid. A theory that ignores it neglects both the cared for and the carers, whose own capabilities for work, rest and political life are squeezed.
Sen's two handicaps
Sen came at disability from the economic side and distinguished two burdens. The earning handicap is the reduced ability to earn income. The conversion handicap is needing more income for the same functionings, for example to pay for a wheelchair, adapted housing or a personal assistant. A household with a disabled member may have an income above the poverty line and still be poor in capabilities once the extra costs are counted.
Between the medical and the social model
Disability activists in Britain in the 1970s and 1980s developed what came to be called the social model of disability. It distinguishes impairment, a condition of the body or mind, from disability, the exclusion produced by a society built without that impairment in mind. On this view the staircase that bars the way, not the wheelchair, is what disables a wheelchair user. The older medical model located the problem in the individual.
Many writers see the capabilities approach as a bridge. Through conversion factors it treats disability as a condition interacting with surroundings: what a person can do depends on both. It can therefore call for ramps and sign language, as the social model does, while recognizing, as the medical model does, that some impairments bring pain or limits that no redesign removes. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted in 2006, takes a similar interactive view.
Choice in hard cases
The approach faces real difficulties here. If the goal is capabilities rather than functionings, what about people who cannot choose for themselves? Nussbaum argued that some capabilities, including political ones, can be secured through a guardian who acts on the person's behalf and, as far as possible, according to their wishes. Many disability advocates prefer supported decision making, in which the person decides with help, to substituted decision making, in which someone decides for them.
Beyond the nation and the species
The other two frontiers get briefer treatment here. Because capabilities belong to human beings as such, Nussbaum held that duties to secure them reach beyond national borders. In Justice for Animals (2023) she extended the approach to other creatures, arguing that animals too have characteristic ways of flourishing that humans should not thwart.
Worked example: the town hall vote
A town is holding a referendum, and its polling station is on the second floor of an old building with no lift. Residents include Sam, who uses a wheelchair; Ana, who is blind; and Clara, an adult with a severe cognitive disability who lives with her father. A capability view asks whether each can actually vote. For Sam, the barrier is environmental, and a ground-floor station or a ramp removes it. For Ana, a ballot in braille or an audio voting machine lets her vote in secret. Clara's case is harder. Supported decision making might let her express a view with help from someone she trusts. Where even that is impossible, Nussbaum's guardian idea would let her father vote on her behalf, a solution critics fear could override her. The approach turns abstract equality into specific questions, and forces hard choices into the open.
