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Back in Cambridge after 1929, Wittgenstein began dismantling his own masterpiece. His second great work, Philosophical Investigations, was published in 1953, two years after his death, edited by his students Elizabeth Anscombe and Rush Rhees and translated by Anscombe. Where the Tractatus was crystalline and severe, the Investigations is a sequence of questions, examples and imagined conversations.

Meaning as use

The book opens with a passage from Saint Augustine describing how he learned language as a child: adults named objects and pointed at them. Wittgenstein suggests that this picture, in which every word names a thing, is the root of many confusions, including those of his own earlier book. He then imagines a simple language used by builders. One calls out "slab," "block," "pillar" or "beam," and the other brings the stone called for. These words are not names standing for objects so much as moves in an activity. They do many jobs besides naming.

From such cases Wittgenstein drew his most quoted claim: that for a large class of cases, the meaning of a word is its use in the language. To understand a word is to know how to use it in the many activities he called language games: giving orders, telling stories, making jokes, praying, reporting an experiment.

Rules and private sensations

Two famous arguments follow. The first concerns rules. Suppose a pupil is taught to continue the series 2, 4, 6, 8, and after 1,000 writes 1,004, 1,008. He insists he is going on in the same way. Nothing in the examples he was shown rules out his reading. Wittgenstein's point is that no finite set of examples fixes a rule by itself; following a rule is a shared practice, sustained by training and agreement in how we react.

The second concerns sensations. Could someone have a language whose words refer to private sensations that no one else could ever know about? Wittgenstein imagines that everyone has a box containing something they call a "beetle," and no one can look into anyone else's box. The word "beetle" might still have a use, but the thing in the box would play no part in it; it could even be empty. The private object drops out as irrelevant to the meaning of the word. Words for pain get their meaning from public life: from groans, from comfort, from the shared practice of asking where it hurts.

Philosophy as therapy

The later Wittgenstein did not offer a new theory to replace the old one. He thought philosophical problems arise when language "goes on holiday," when words are pulled out of the settings where they do their work. Asked about the aim of philosophy, he answered that it was to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle. The aim of philosophy was to free us from confusion, not to build theories.

Oxford and ordinary language

In the 1940s and 1950s a related movement flourished at Oxford, though it grew largely on its own. Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind (1949) attacked the picture of a mind as an invisible inner thing that runs the body, which he mocked as a ghostly pilot inside a machine. He diagnosed it as a category mistake. Ryle's example is a visitor who is shown the colleges, library and laboratories and then asks where the University is, as if it were one more building alongside them.

Peter Strawson's "On Referring" (1950) took aim at Russell. Strawson argued that "The present King of France is bald" does not assert that there is a king; it presupposes it. When a presupposition fails, the sentence is neither true nor false, because the question of its truth does not arise.

J. L. Austin, the most meticulous of the group, studied the fine distinctions built into everyday words. In a famous example, Austin's two donkeys show the difference between doing something by accident and doing it by mistake. If I aim at my donkey, fire and the bullet hits yours, I shot yours by accident. If I take your donkey for mine and shoot it, I shot it by mistake.

Critics pushed back hard. In Words and Things (1959) Ernest Gellner charged that ordinary language philosophy was trivial and conservative, treating the way educated Englishmen happened to speak as a final authority. Russell, who wrote its foreword, agreed.

Worked example: "I'm sorry if you were offended"

A public figure, criticized for a remark, says: "I'm sorry if anyone was offended." Is it an apology? An ordinary language philosopher would look at how the words are used. A real apology names what the speaker did, accepts responsibility and is addressed to those harmed. This sentence names no act, makes the hurt conditional on others' reactions, and places the problem in their feelings rather than in the speaker's words.

Austin's method shows why the sentence satisfies no one, even though it contains the word "sorry." Saying "sorry" in one language game, sympathy at a funeral, is different from saying it in another, admitting fault. That recognition is the evidence ordinary language philosophers relied on: our shared, practiced sense of how words work often knows more than our theories about them.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. What did Philosophical Investigations say about the meaning of a word, for a large class of cases?
2. What does the builders' example of "slab" and "block" suggest?
3. What did Wittgenstein conclude about following a rule?
4. What does the beetle in a box show about private sensations?
5. What did the later Wittgenstein say the aim of philosophy was?
6. Which example did Ryle use to explain a category mistake?
7. What did Strawson say about "The present King of France is bald"?
8. What do Austin's two donkeys illustrate?

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