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Willard Van Orman Quine (1908 to 2000) was an American logician who traveled to Vienna and Prague in 1932 and 1933, met the Circle and became a devoted friend of Carnap. Then, over the next decades, he did more than anyone to bring down the framework they had built.

Two dogmas

Since Kant, philosophers had distinguished analytic truths, true by virtue of meaning alone ("no bachelor is married"), from synthetic truths, true because of how the world is ("no bachelor in this town owns a boat"). The Vienna Circle relied on the distinction: logic and mathematics were analytic, and so known without experience; everything else had to answer to experience. In "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (1951) Quine argued that a sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic truths was the first of two dogmas that empiricists had accepted without good reason.

His argument was that the notion of analyticity could not be explained without going in a circle. "No bachelor is married" is supposed to be analytic because "bachelor" is synonymous with "unmarried man." But what is synonymy? Perhaps two words are synonymous if one can be swapped for the other without changing truth, but only in sentences of a special kind, which turn out to be the analytic ones. Every attempt to define analyticity relied on notions just as unclear. Quine concluded that there is no principled line between truths of meaning and truths of fact, and so no sharp border between philosophy and science.

What there is

Quine also offered a test for what a theory says exists. In "On What There Is" (1948) he argued, in substance, that a theory is committed to whatever its quantified variables must range over. If your best theory of physics, put into logical form, must say "there is some x such that x is an electron," then you are committed to electrons.

Gavagai

In Word and Object (1960) Quine imagined a linguist working with speakers of a language no outsider has ever learned. A rabbit runs past and a speaker says "gavagai." The linguist writes "rabbit." But the same evidence fits "undetached rabbit parts" or "a temporary stage of a rabbit," since wherever there is a rabbit there are also its parts and stages. Quine argued that the evidence cannot settle which of several translations is right, and that there may be no fact of the matter. This is the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation.

Knowledge as a natural process

If philosophy has no special truths of its own, how should it study knowledge? In "Epistemology Naturalized" (1969) Quine proposed to study knowledge as part of empirical science, especially psychology: to ask how human beings, given the stimulation of their senses, come to build theories of the world. Critics answered that this changes the subject. Psychology describes how we form beliefs; epistemology asks which beliefs we ought to hold.

Carnap, for his part, held his ground. In a 1950 essay he distinguished questions asked inside a framework, such as "is there a prime number above a hundred?", from the question of whether to adopt the framework at all. Whether to adopt a framework is a practical choice, not a factual question, to be decided by convenience and fruitfulness.

The return of big questions

Others attacked further foundations. Wilfrid Sellars argued in 1956 against what he called the myth of the given: the idea that raw experience yields knowledge without needing any concepts. Even to notice that something looks red, he held, one must already have a network of concepts. Then, in lectures given in 1970, Saul Kripke argued that names pick out the same thing in every possible situation, and that some necessary truths, such as that water is H2O, are discovered by experience. Metaphysics, once dismissed by the Circle as nonsense, became a thriving field again.

Today analytic philosophy has few shared doctrines. What survives is the method: say exactly what you mean, lay out your reasons, and welcome the objection that shows you wrong. Those are civic virtues as much as academic ones.

Worked example: is a tomato a fruit?

In 1893 the United States Supreme Court had to decide whether imported tomatoes were taxable as vegetables. Botanically, a tomato is a fruit, the seed-bearing part of a plant. The importers argued that "tomatoes are vegetables" was simply false. The Court disagreed. In the common language of the people, wrote Justice Horace Gray, tomatoes are "usually served at dinner in, with, or after the soup, fish, or meats which constitute the principal part of the repast, and not, like fruits generally, as dessert."

Is "a tomato is a fruit" true by meaning alone? For botanists, it seems so. For cooks and grocers, its denial seems true by meaning. Quine would say this is just what we should expect. There is no fixed store of meanings that settles such questions in advance, only overlapping practices of use, interwoven with facts about plants and dinners. The Court did what Carnap recommended: it chose the framework that suited the purpose, here a tariff law written for merchants, not botanists.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. What did Quine call the first dogma of empiricism?
2. Why did Quine reject the notion of analyticity?
3. What is Quine's test of ontological commitment?
4. What is the point of Quine's "gavagai" example?
5. What did Quine propose in "Epistemology Naturalized" (1969)?
6. How did Carnap answer the question of whether to adopt a framework?
7. What did Sellars call the myth of the given?
8. What did Kripke argue about truths such as "water is H2O"?

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