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By the mid twentieth century many philosophers thought the social contract was a museum piece. Utilitarianism dominated moral philosophy in the English-speaking world. Then in 1971 the Harvard philosopher John Rawls published A Theory of Justice, and the contract came back to life.

Raising the contract to a higher level

Rawls said plainly what he was doing. Rawls described his aim as generalizing the classic social contract theory of Locke, Rousseau and Kant and carrying it to a higher level of abstraction. The agreement no longer sets up a particular government. Its object is the basic principles of justice for the main institutions of a society. And it is openly hypothetical. Rawls replaced the state of nature with what he called the original position, a carefully designed situation of choice. Its parties are free and equal, rational, and mutually disinterested, meaning they take no interest in one another's interests, neither envious nor benevolent. A veil of ignorance hides facts about their own place in society so that no one can tailor principles to suit himself.

Why call it justice as fairness?

The name of Rawls's theory states its central idea. Rawls called his view justice as fairness because the principles are fair when they are agreed in a fair initial situation. The original position aims to build such fairness into the conditions of choice, so that whatever is chosen inherits it.

Rawls also added a constraint. The parties must choose principles they could actually live by. Rawls's strains of commitment rule out principles that people could not honor if they turned out to be among the losers.

Testing the theory: reflective equilibrium

How do we know the original position is set up correctly? Rawls's answer was a method. We start with our most confident judgments, such as that religious persecution and racial discrimination are unjust, and with candidate principles. Where they clash, we adjust one or the other. Reflective equilibrium is the state reached by fitting principles and considered judgments to each other, moving back and forth and revising each until they agree.

Is a hypothetical contract any contract?

Critics pressed Hume's old worry in new form. In 1973 the legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin argued that a hypothetical contract is not a weaker version of a real one but no contract at all. Dworkin's objection was that hypothetical agreement binds no one, so the force must come from the reasons behind it. If I would have sold you my painting yesterday for a hundred dollars, you cannot hold me to that price today. Rawls's defenders accept the point and turn it into a description. The original position is a device of representation: it models conditions we already accept as fair, so the agreement is a way of showing what those conditions imply.

Scanlon: what we can justify to each other

The philosopher T. M. Scanlon extended contract thinking from political institutions to morality itself, first in a 1982 paper and then in What We Owe to Each Other (1998). In paraphrase, his formula says that an act is wrong if it would be disallowed by any set of principles for governing behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement. The key word is reasonably: the test is not what self-interested bargainers would accept, but what people looking for common ground could not fairly refuse.

Scanlon located moral motivation in the desire to be able to justify our actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject. That desire, not fear or advantage, is what the contract appeals to. Scanlon also restricted how objections are compared. Under Scanlon's individualist restriction, objections are weighed person by person, not added up across many people. His famous case: a man named Jones has been trapped under fallen equipment in the transmitter room of a television station during a World Cup match. Freeing him means cutting the broadcast for fifteen minutes. Scanlon held that we must rescue Jones, however many viewers would miss the match, because no single viewer's complaint compares with his. Critics reply that the word "reasonable" may already contain the morality it is meant to explain, and that refusing to add up harms makes it hard to say why we should save five lives rather than one.

Worked example: a cheaper factory process

A company can switch to a cheaper production process. The new process exposes a small number of workers to a real risk of serious lung disease, while saving each of millions of customers about a cent per purchase. A purely additive calculation might favor the switch, since a cent times millions is a large sum.

Apply Scanlon's test. Could the exposed workers reasonably reject a principle permitting the switch? Their complaint is grave: damaged health for life. Could any single customer reasonably reject a principle forbidding it? Their complaint is a cent. Compared person by person, the workers' objection wins, and the switch is wrong. Now use Rawls's lens at the level of institutions: would free and equal people, not knowing whether they would be customers or workers, set up safety rules allowing such trade-offs? The two methods arrive at the same place, but notice the different questions each one asks.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. How did Rawls describe his aim in A Theory of Justice?
2. What does Rawls mean by calling the parties mutually disinterested?
3. Why did Rawls call his theory justice as fairness?
4. What do Rawls's strains of commitment rule out?
5. What is reflective equilibrium?
6. What was Dworkin's objection to hypothetical contracts?
7. According to Scanlon, what moves us to act morally?
8. What does Scanlon's individualist restriction require?

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