A life between catastrophes
Emmanuel Levinas (1906 to 1995) was born to a Jewish family in Kaunas, Lithuania, studied in Strasbourg and spent 1928 to 1929 in Freiburg, attending Husserl's last lectures and hearing Heidegger. His 1930 thesis on Husserl's theory of intuition helped introduce phenomenology to France, and he co-translated Husserl's Cartesian Meditations into French. In the Second World War he served in the French army, was captured, and spent the war as a prisoner of war in a German camp. His wife and daughter survived in hiding in France; most of his family in Lithuania was murdered. His mature philosophy, in Totality and Infinity (1961) and Otherwise than Being (1974), can be read as an effort to think after that catastrophe.
The problem with totality
Levinas admired Husserl and Heidegger, but he charged that Western philosophy, including theirs, has a deep habit. It tends to reduce the other to the same: to understand anything new by fitting it into categories the knower already holds. Knowledge grasps, comprehends and possesses. Heidegger's question about being, Levinas thought, continued this habit, since it placed people within an anonymous whole. Levinas called such all-embracing systems totality, and he linked their logic, at its worst, to political projects that treat individuals as parts to be used or discarded.
Ethics as first philosophy
Against this, Levinas made a startling claim. The most basic relation is not knowing but responsibility. The ethical relation to the other person comes before knowledge and before any theory of being. He called this ethics as first philosophy. Before I classify you, I am already addressed by you, and already answerable.
The face
The place where this happens Levinas called the face. He did not mean the arrangement of eyes and nose, which can be described like any object. The face is the other person's vulnerable presence, which calls me to responsibility. Its exposure, its nakedness, speaks before any words; its first meaning, Levinas wrote, is in effect "you shall not kill". This is not a physical barrier, since people can be killed. It is an ethical resistance: to kill, or to use someone as a mere tool, is to override an appeal that has already reached me.
The face also cannot be captured. Levinas used the word infinity for this: the other always exceeds my ideas of them. However much I know about a person, they can still surprise me, contradict me, answer back. To treat my picture of someone as complete is already to begin to totalize them.
Asymmetry
Most moral theories describe obligations between equals: I owe you what you owe me. Levinas insisted on asymmetry. My responsibility for the other does not wait for them to return it. He liked to quote a line from Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov (1880): each of us is guilty before everyone, and I more than the others. In his later work he pushed this further, describing the self as a hostage to the other, responsible even for the other's responsibility.
The third party and justice
This sounds impossible as a guide to public life, and Levinas knew it. In the face-to-face relation there are only two. But the world is crowded. As soon as there is another person beside the one before me, a third, I must compare, weigh and judge between them. Levinas held that the third party introduces the need for justice, law and institutions. The state, courts and rights are necessary, but their legitimacy comes from the responsibility they organize, and they must be checked against the faces they can forget. In later essays he defended human rights as, at root, the rights of the other person.
Criticisms
Levinas has been criticized on several fronts. In a long 1964 essay, "Violence and Metaphysics", Jacques Derrida argued that Levinas must use the very language of philosophy that he criticizes, so that his escape from totality is never clean. Others find his ethics too demanding to live by, or too vague to settle any real dispute. Some ask whether the face extends to animals, or whether it is limited to those who look like us. Defenders reply that Levinas offers not a rulebook but a reminder of what rules are for.
Worked example: the benefits office
A caseworker at a benefits office faces a long queue. The next person has the wrong form and is close to tears. The caseworker could see a case number and a missing document: the other reduced to a category. Levinas would say that before any of that, the person's face has already made a claim. Their vulnerability addresses the caseworker directly, and the caseworker is answerable.
Yet the queue behind is full of other faces. If the caseworker bends every rule for this person, others with equal need wait longer. That is the third party, and it is why the office needs fair procedures at all. Levinas's thought does not erase the rules. It asks that they be applied by someone who still sees the person in front of them, and that rules which routinely crush people be changed.
