Critical theory did not stop with Habermas. This level looks at a third generation within the Frankfurt tradition, and at the broader uses of the phrase “critical theory” that grew up alongside it.

Honneth and recognition

Axel Honneth, born in 1949, directed the Institute for Social Research from 2001 to 2018. In The Struggle for Recognition (1992) he argued that many social conflicts are driven not only by material interests but by experiences of disrespect: being humiliated, ignored or denied equal standing. Drawing on Hegel, he described three forms of recognition that people need to develop a healthy sense of themselves:

• Love in close relationships, which supports basic self-confidence.
• Rights, or legal respect as an equal, which supports self-respect.
• Social esteem for one's contributions, which supports self-esteem.

The philosopher Nancy Fraser challenged Honneth, arguing that justice requires both redistribution of resources and recognition, and that neither can be reduced to the other. Their exchange was published as Redistribution or Recognition? (2003).

The broader use of “critical theory”

Outside the Frankfurt tradition, “critical theory” is now often used, especially in English-speaking universities, as a loose umbrella term for approaches that examine how power operates through institutions, language and knowledge. In literature departments it may include thinkers such as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, who came from quite different French traditions and in some cases disagreed with the Frankfurt School. It is important not to treat everything under this umbrella as one theory.

Critical legal studies

Critical legal studies emerged in American law schools in the late 1970s. Its scholars argued that law is not a neutral, purely logical system: legal rules are often indeterminate, so judges' decisions reflect political and social choices, and the law tends to protect existing hierarchies while presenting them as natural. They drew on earlier American legal realism, on Marxism and, to some extent, on the Frankfurt School.

Critical race theory

Critical race theory grew out of legal scholarship in the 1970s and 1980s, partly from critical legal studies and partly from frustration that civil rights laws had not ended racial inequality. Early figures included Derrick Bell, Kimberlé Crenshaw, Richard Delgado and Mari Matsuda. Key ideas include:

• Racism is not only individual prejudice; it can be built into laws and institutions that appear neutral on their face.
• Bell's interest convergence thesis: civil rights gains have tended to come when they also served the interests of powerful white groups.
• Crenshaw's concept of intersectionality (1989): discrimination based on race and sex can combine in ways that laws treating each separately fail to see.

Critical race theory is distinct from the Frankfurt School. It drew mainly on American legal thought, the civil rights movement and earlier Black thinkers such as W.E.B. Du Bois, not directly on Horkheimer or Adorno. Sharing the word “critical” and an interest in power does not make them the same theory. Some critics stress an indirect line of descent, since critical legal studies drew partly on the Frankfurt School; most critical race theory scholars describe their work as a separate, American tradition.

Contested debates

Since about 2020, “critical race theory” has become a heated term in American political debate, especially about schools. In that debate it is often used, by supporters and opponents alike, for a much wider range of ideas than the academic legal scholarship. Supporters argue the ideas help explain why inequalities have lasted after open discrimination was outlawed, and that personal narratives can bring out experiences that official records miss. Critics argue that some of the scholarship relies on personal narrative over evidence, treats people mainly as members of groups, and conflicts with the ideal of equal treatment regardless of race. A careful reader starts by asking which ideas, from which sources, are actually under discussion.

Worked example: one rule, several lenses

An invented city passes a rule that only residents who have lived in the city for ten years may apply for a limited number of affordable housing units. The rule says nothing about race or income.

A traditional legal reading asks whether the rule is clearly written, within the city's powers and applied consistently. Since it treats every applicant by the same standard, it passes.

A critical legal studies reading notes that judges reviewing the rule could reasonably decide it either way, depending on how they weigh the city's interest in stability against the right to move freely. The outcome would reflect values, not pure logic.

A critical race theory reading asks who has lived in the city for ten years. If earlier housing policies kept certain groups out, a neutral-sounding rule could carry past exclusion into the present. Intersectionality would also ask whether, say, single mothers of a particular group are affected in a way that looking at race or sex alone would miss.

A recognition reading, following Honneth, would ask whether newcomers experience the rule as a denial of equal standing.

A critic's reply: The rule rewards long-term community ties, which is a legitimate goal. Unequal effects alone do not prove bad intent, and judging every neutral rule by its group outcomes could undermine the principle of treating individuals equally.

Each lens highlights something real. Whether the rule should stand depends on evidence about its actual effects, and on which values one weighs most heavily.