The United Nations began in 1945 with 51 members. By the end of 1960 it had 99, and most of the newcomers were former colonies in Asia and Africa. The Cold War unfolded at the same time as the largest transfer of political power in modern history, the end of European empires. For many of the world's people, independence mattered far more than the quarrel between Washington and Moscow, and both superpowers had to compete for their loyalty.

A third world

In 1952 the French demographer Alfred Sauvy wrote of a third world, comparing the poor, newly independent nations to the Third Estate of revolutionary France: ignored and exploited, but destined to claim its place. The term Third World was coined in 1952 by the French demographer Alfred Sauvy. It first meant a political position outside both blocs, and only later became a label for poverty. Many people now prefer terms like the Global South.

In April 1955, leaders from newly independent states met in Bandung, Indonesia. The Bandung Conference of 1955 brought together 29 Asian and African countries to condemn colonialism and discuss cooperation. India's Jawaharlal Nehru, Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, Indonesia's Sukarno and China's Zhou Enlai were among those present. In 1961 a meeting in Belgrade, hosted by Yugoslavia's Tito, gave this outlook a permanent form. The Non-Aligned Movement was founded in 1961 by states that refused to join either bloc.

The case for and against non-alignment

Its defenders argued that new nations should not trade one form of outside control for another, and that a large group of states outside both blocs could reduce the danger of war and push both superpowers toward the needs of poorer countries. Non-alignment also brought practical gains: some states received aid from both sides. Critics pointed out that many members leaned clearly toward one bloc, that the movement was too varied to act together, and that several of its leaders ran one party states while lecturing others about freedom.

Competing for the newly independent

Both superpowers offered aid, loans, weapons and advisers. When the United States withdrew an offer to help fund Egypt's Aswan High Dam in 1956, the Soviet Union stepped in. The Soviets presented themselves as the natural friend of anti-colonial struggles, and they did support many liberation movements, from Vietnam to the African National Congress in South Africa. The United States presented itself as a former colony and a champion of self-determination, but it often backed European allies such as Portugal, which fought colonial wars in Africa until 1974.

Both sides also used force and covert action. In 1951 Iran's elected prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, nationalized the oil industry, which had been controlled by a British company. In 1953 the CIA and British intelligence helped overthrow Mosaddegh, restoring the power of the Shah, whose rule grew harsher until the revolution of 1979. In 1954 a CIA backed coup removed Guatemala's elected president, Jacobo Árbenz, whose land reform had taken unused land from the American owned United Fruit Company. The Soviet Union, for its part, armed and advised governments such as the Ethiopian regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam, whose Red Terror killed tens of thousands, and supported tens of thousands of Cuban troops sent to Angola. In each case, defenders saw a necessary move to block the other side, while critics saw local people's choices overridden in the name of a global contest. The usual result of superpower intervention was that local politics were judged by bloc loyalty rather than by the wishes of the people.

Worked example: the Congo, 1960 to 1965

Belgium ruled the Congo with notorious brutality and left it with very few university graduates when it granted independence in June 1960. Within days the army mutinied, Belgian troops returned, and the mineral rich province of Katanga, backed by Belgian business interests, declared itself independent. Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, a fiery nationalist, appealed to the United Nations and, when that seemed too slow, to the Soviet Union for help. In Washington this looked like the opening of a Soviet foothold in the heart of Africa, and the CIA drew up plans to kill him. Lumumba was deposed in September 1960 and, in January 1961, handed to his enemies in Katanga and shot with Belgian officers present. A United States Senate inquiry in 1975 later exposed the CIA plots, and Belgium apologized in 2002 for its share of moral responsibility. The army officer Joseph Mobutu, backed by the West, seized full power in 1965 and ruled for 32 years while the country's wealth drained into his accounts. Apply the even-handed test. American officials feared a real Soviet opportunity, and Moscow did send aid to Lumumba's government. But the Congolese people's first elected leader was removed by outsiders, and the dictatorship that followed showed what bloc logic could cost a new nation.