Negotiation is any back-and-forth communication aimed at reaching an agreement when people have some interests in common and some opposed. We negotiate constantly: over prices, schedules, chores and contracts. The most influential modern guide to doing it well is Getting to Yes (1981), by Roger Fisher and William Ury of the Harvard Negotiation Project.

The problem with positional bargaining

Fisher and Ury begin by criticizing the usual approach, which they call positional bargaining: each side stakes out a position, then they haggle toward a middle point. In their view this tends to produce unwise agreements, wastes time, and strains relationships, because each side becomes attached to defending its position rather than solving the problem. Being “soft” does not fix this, since a soft bargainer simply gets exploited by a hard one. They propose a third way, principled negotiation, built on four points.

1. Separate the people from the problem

Every negotiator is a person with emotions, values and a need to save face. When people feel attacked, they defend themselves rather than think. Fisher and Ury advise being soft on the people and hard on the problem: deal with perceptions, emotions and communication directly, and treat the other side as a partner facing a shared problem, not as an enemy.

2. Focus on interests, not positions

A position is what someone says they want. An interest is why they want it: the need, worry or hope underneath. The book tells a version of a story first told by the management thinker Mary Parker Follett in the 1920s. Two people in a library argue over whether to open a window. One wants fresh air; the other wants to avoid a draft. In the book's version, the librarian opens a window in the next room, giving fresh air without a draft. Asking “why?” and “why not?” is the basic tool for uncovering interests.

3. Invent options for mutual gain

People often assume the pie is fixed, so that one side's gain is the other's loss. Fisher and Ury urge negotiators to separate inventing options from judging them: brainstorm many possibilities first, without committing, and evaluate later. Look for differences that can be traded. If one side cares more about timing and the other about price, both can gain by trading one for the other.

4. Insist on objective criteria

When interests truly clash, do not settle by a contest of will. Instead, agree on fair standards independent of either side's will, such as market value, expert opinion, precedent, scientific findings or a fair procedure. A classic fair procedure is “one cuts, the other chooses,” used to divide a cake. Each side can then accept the outcome without feeling it simply gave in.

Know your BATNA

Fisher and Ury also introduced a term now used everywhere: BATNA, the Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement. It is what you will do if this negotiation fails: take another job offer, sell to another buyer, go to court. Your BATNA is the standard against which any proposed deal should be measured. If a deal is better than your BATNA, consider accepting it; if not, walk away. A strong BATNA gives you power in a negotiation, and improving your BATNA before you negotiate is often the best way to strengthen your hand.

Strengths and criticisms

Its defenders say it produces wiser agreements and better relationships. Critics reply that it can be naive when one side is far more powerful or acting in bad faith, and that some conflicts really are about fixed resources. Fisher and Ury answered that the BATNA idea is exactly their response to power: you cannot make a weak hand strong by tactics, but you can know when to walk away.

Worked example: Egypt, Israel and the Sinai

Getting to Yes uses a famous historical case to show the difference between positions and interests. After the 1967 war, Israel occupied Egypt's Sinai Peninsula. When the two countries negotiated at Camp David in 1978, their positions seemed impossible to reconcile. Egypt wanted all of the Sinai back. Israel wanted to keep part of it.

Look beneath the positions. Egypt's interest was sovereignty: the Sinai had been Egyptian territory for a very long time, and returning only part of it would have felt like a humiliation. Israel's interest was security: it did not want Egyptian tanks positioned on its border, ready to attack.

Once the interests were clear, an option for mutual gain appeared. The Sinai would be returned to Egyptian sovereignty, but large parts of it would be demilitarized, with limits on Egyptian forces and international monitors. Egyptian flags could fly everywhere; Egyptian tanks could not go everywhere. Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty in 1979, and the Sinai was returned in stages, completed in 1982.

Now apply the other principles. People and problem: the talks at Camp David, hosted by US President Jimmy Carter, were long and personal, and the mediator worked hard to manage the leaders' emotions and pride. Objective criteria: international law and earlier United Nations resolutions provided reference points. BATNA: for both sides, the alternative to agreement was continued hostility and the risk of another war, which made a deal attractive.

The treaty did not solve every problem in the region, but the peace between the two countries has held for decades.