For most of recorded history, almost everyone lived under rulers they could not remove. Even today, by several common measures, a majority of humanity lives under governments that do not face fully free and fair elections. Yet modern authoritarian rule rarely looks like a cartoon tyrant. Many dictatorships hold elections, keep parliaments, write constitutions and allow some newspapers to publish. To see what is happening when a democracy erodes, you first need a clear picture of what it erodes toward.
A working definition
In 1964 the Spanish-born political scientist Juan Linz, studying Franco's Spain, offered a definition that is still widely used. He described authoritarian regimes as having limited political pluralism: some independent groups, such as churches, businesses or professional bodies, are tolerated, but no one can compete freely for supreme power. Linz also noted that such regimes usually run on loose mentalities rather than elaborate guiding ideologies, appeals to order, nation, faith or development, and that they do not try to mobilize the whole population permanently. That last point separates them from totalitarian regimes, which seek to remake society and the inner life of citizens.
A simpler definition used by many researchers is that a regime is authoritarian when rulers are not chosen and removed through free, fair and competitive elections. This puts the stress on accountability. A government can be efficient, popular and even generous and still be authoritarian, because citizens cannot peacefully replace it if they change their minds.
Kinds of authoritarian rule
Scholars sort dictatorships by who holds power. In personalist regimes power flows from one leader, whose family and loyalists fill key posts. In party regimes a disciplined ruling party controls careers and policy, as in China. In military regimes officers rule as an institution, as in Argentina in the late 1970s or Myanmar today. Monarchies form a further type. Here the point is practical: the type matters for how a regime behaves and how it ends. The researchers Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Frantz and Joseph Wright reported that personalist dictatorships have become a growing share of the world's autocracies since the end of the Cold War. Because a personalist ruler faces few internal checks, such regimes are prone to erratic decisions, and they often end badly, with the leader's fall bringing down the whole system.
The two problems every dictator faces
No one rules alone. In The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (2012), Milan Svolik argued that dictators face two distinct problems. The first is the problem of power sharing: keeping the inner circle of allies loyal, since the ruler needs them but they are also the people best placed to replace the ruler. The second is the problem of control: keeping the mass of the population from rising up. Svolik's data show that most dictators who lost power by nonconstitutional means were removed by regime insiders, not by popular revolt. This is why so many autocrats spend heavily on rewarding, watching and rotating their own generals and ministers.
A related idea, called selectorate theory, was developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues in The Logic of Political Survival (2003). Every leader depends on a "winning coalition," the people whose support keeps the leader in office. In a democracy that coalition is large, a voting majority, so leaders do best by providing public goods such as roads and schools. When the winning coalition is small, leaders survive best by handing out private rewards to a few key supporters. The theory helps explain why corruption is often a feature of authoritarian rule rather than a malfunction.
Elections without choice
Many present-day autocracies are electoral autocracies: they hold multiparty elections on schedule, but the contest is tilted by control of media, courts, money and election officials. Elections still serve rulers in several ways. They show off strength, reveal which local officials can deliver votes, and give the regime a claim to legitimacy at home and abroad. They can also become moments of danger for rulers, which is why manipulation is common and why surprise defeats sometimes happen.
Worked example
Imagine a country called Veloria. It has a constitution guaranteeing free speech, a parliament with four parties and a presidential election every five years. The president has won four times with about 70 percent of the vote. Two television networks are owned by his brother-in-law; the third lost its license after airing a corruption story. Opposition candidates are on the ballot, but their rallies are often refused permits. The army chief and the interior minister are both cousins of the president.
Apply the tools. Is there limited pluralism? Yes: parties and churches exist, but no one can compete on equal terms for the presidency. Is there accountability? Not really, because the election cannot realistically remove the president. Who holds power? The family ties at the top point toward a personalist regime. What does Svolik's framework predict? The greatest threat to this president comes from his own inner circle, so watch for purges or sudden promotions. Veloria is an electoral autocracy, and its elections, while unfree, still matter: a sudden collapse in turnout or a split among the president's relatives would be a warning sign for the regime.
