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For two decades the mfecane looked like settled history. Then in 1988 a historian at Rhodes University, Julian Cobbing, published an article whose title was a challenge in itself: "The Mfecane as Alibi." He argued that the whole story was not only wrong but convenient, a tale that hid the role of Europeans in the violence and excused what came after. The argument that followed became one of the fiercest debates in African history, and it changed how the period is studied.

Cobbing's charge

Cobbing made three main claims. First, he said the classic story was "Zulucentric," blaming nearly all the violence on Shaka and his neighbors while ignoring outside forces. Second, he argued that those outside forces were the real engines of disruption. On the east coast, he said, the slave trade at Delagoa Bay was sending raiders inland to capture people for sale. On the western and southern edges, Griqua and other mixed race horsemen from the Cape frontier, along with colonial settlers and even missionaries, were raiding for cattle and for captive laborers, whom the colony needed. In this view, the African states of the period were defending themselves against a slave and labor frontier, not causing chaos on their own.

Third, and most provocatively, Cobbing argued that the mfecane had served a political purpose. Settler historians had long claimed that the interior was largely empty when the Voortrekkers arrived in the 1830s, because African peoples had destroyed each other. That "empty land" story made white settlement look like the filling of a vacuum rather than conquest, and it was later used to justify the land laws and homelands of apartheid. If the mfecane was exaggerated, so was the emptiness.

Two test cases

Cobbing built his case partly on two battles. At Dithakong in 1823, Griqua horsemen, called in by the missionary Robert Moffat and his allies, routed a large body of hungry migrants threatening the Tswana town there. The standard story treated the migrants as refugees of the Zulu wars; Cobbing argued that the Griqua took captives who ended up as laborers in the Cape. At Mbolompo in 1828, a British colonial force attacked the Ngwane people of Matiwane, believing them to be a Zulu army, and scattered them. Survivors, Cobbing noted, were taken into the colony as workers.

The response

The reply came quickly and from many sides. At a large conference at the University of the Witwatersrand in 1991, historians tested every part of the argument, and the papers appeared in 1995 as The Mfecane Aftermath, edited by Carolyn Hamilton. Several critics, among them Elizabeth Eldredge, raised a problem of timing. The evidence suggests that the Delagoa Bay slave trade grew large only from the 1820s, after the main wars between the Zulu and the Ndwandwe were already over. A cause cannot come after its effect. Others pointed out that Cobbing had at times read the sources selectively and that African rulers had political ambitions of their own, which his account tended to flatten into reactions.

Yet much of Cobbing's challenge stuck. Few historians now describe the period as a simple chain reaction set off by one king. Most now see a combination of causes: drought and famine, competition for land as populations grew, rivalry over the ivory trade, and, increasingly in the 1820s and 1830s, slaving and labor raiding from the coast and the Cape. Many also agree that the "empty land" story was false and politically useful. Some scholars have dropped the word mfecane altogether, preferring neutral phrases about the upheavals of the period.

Worked example: testing a cause by its timing

The heart of the debate is a simple question any historian can ask of any explanation: did the proposed cause come before the effect, and was it big enough?

Lay out a rough timeline. The Ndwandwe and Zulu built their larger states in the 1810s. Their decisive wars came around 1818 and 1819. Records of ships and officials at Delagoa Bay suggest that large numbers of slaves began leaving the port in the early to mid 1820s. On that timeline, the slave trade cannot explain the rise of the Zulu state, but it may well have deepened the violence in the years that followed.

Now apply the same test to drought. If the Madlathule famine really struck around 1800, it came before the larger states formed and could have helped push people toward strong leaders. The date rests on oral tradition, so the case is weaker than one would like.

This simple method does not settle every argument, but it rules some explanations in and others out. It also shows why the mfecane debate was valuable even where Cobbing was wrong: it forced historians to put dates on claims that had once rested on a good story.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. Who argued in 1988 that the mfecane was an alibi?
2. What did Cobbing mean by calling the classic story Zulucentric?
3. Which trade did Cobbing see as a key cause on the east coast?
4. What did the empty land story claim?
5. Who fought migrants at Dithakong in 1823?
6. Whom did a British colonial force attack at Mbolompo in 1828?
7. Who edited The Mfecane Aftermath, published in 1995?
8. What timing problem did critics raise against Cobbing?

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