In 1914 one American dollar bought about 4.2 German marks. In November 1923 it bought about 4.2 trillion. Few events in modern history destroyed so much savings so fast, and the memory of that year shaped German attitudes toward money for the rest of the century. The same twelve months brought foreign occupation, uprisings on the left and the right, and the first appearance of Adolf Hitler on the national stage.
Paying for the war with paper
The inflation did not begin in 1923. Imperial Germany paid for the First World War mainly by borrowing rather than by raising taxes, expecting to make the defeated enemy pay after victory. By 1918 prices had more than doubled, and the money supply had grown far faster than output. After the war, governments faced huge costs for pensions to disabled veterans and widows, for demobilization and for reparations, while no party wanted to impose the heavy taxes or deep cuts that a balanced budget would require. Printing money kept factories running and unemployment low in 1920 to 1922, when Britain and the United States suffered sharp slumps. For a while inflation looked like the lesser evil.
The Ruhr and the collapse
In January 1923, after Germany fell behind on deliveries of coal and timber, French and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr, Germany's industrial heartland, to collect reparations directly. The government of Chancellor Wilhelm Cuno answered with passive resistance. Workers and officials were urged to refuse all cooperation, and the government paid them by printing money. Production in the Ruhr collapsed while state spending soared, and the mark went into free fall. By the autumn prices were rising by thousands of percent a month. Workers were paid daily, sometimes twice a day, and rushed to spend their wages before they lost value.
Winners and losers
Hyperinflation did not hurt everyone equally. People with savings, bonds, life insurance or fixed pensions were wiped out, and the respectable middle classes who had lent to the state in wartime felt betrayed. Wage earners suffered as pay lagged behind prices. Debtors who owned real assets gained, including the state itself and industrialists who had borrowed to buy mines and factories, since their debts melted away. Farmers saw their mortgages vanish. A revaluation law of 1925 restored only a fraction of old claims, about a quarter for mortgages and far less for war bonds, which left lasting anger.
Stresemann's hundred days
In August 1923 Gustav Stresemann, leader of the liberal German People's Party (DVP), became chancellor at the head of a broad coalition. In September he ended passive resistance in the Ruhr, a deeply unpopular step that nationalists called surrender. The autumn brought crisis on every side. Separatists tried to set up a Rhineland republic. In Saxony, Communists joined the state government, and the national government sent in the army to depose it. A Communist rising in Hamburg in October was crushed within days.
In Munich, Hitler and his small National Socialist party tried to imitate Mussolini's march on Rome. On the night of 8 November 1923, in a beer hall, they proclaimed a national revolution with the backing of Ludendorff. The next day Bavarian police stopped their march through the city, and sixteen putschists and four policemen died. At his trial in 1924 Hitler turned the courtroom into a stage. He was sentenced to five years for treason but released after about nine months, during which he wrote much of his book Mein Kampf.
The cure came in November. A new currency, the Rentenmark, was issued on 15 November 1923, with one Rentenmark worth a trillion old marks. It was backed in name by a mortgage on German land and industry, but its real strength came from strict limits on how many notes were printed and from deep cuts in state spending, including the dismissal of hundreds of thousands of public employees. Prices stabilized almost at once. Stresemann's government fell later that month, but he stayed on as foreign minister.
Worked example: a pensioner's savings
Imagine a retired schoolteacher who in 1913 had 20,000 marks in a savings account and war bonds, enough for a comfortable old age. By the end of 1922 the whole sum could buy what about a dozen marks had bought before the war. By November 1923 it would not buy a postage stamp. Her neighbor, a factory owner who had borrowed to buy a second plant in 1921, paid off his loan with money worth almost nothing and kept the plant. Neither had broken any law. Yet she had done what the state asked, saving and lending to her country, and been ruined, while he had gambled and won.
Historians such as Gerald Feldman have shown how this experience eroded faith in the republic among the very groups that might have been its natural supporters. It taught many people that thrift counted for nothing and that the state could not be trusted with their basic security. Some blamed speculators, some blamed the Allies, and some, encouraged by nationalist propaganda, blamed Jews. Few blamed the wartime empire whose borrowing had started the slide, which is a reminder that people often judge a government by the disasters that happen on its watch rather than by the ones it inherits.
