Today the great majority of Iranians are Shi'i Muslims, and Iran has the largest Shi'i population of any country. It is easy to assume it was always so. It was not. When Ismail took Tabriz, most people on the Iranian plateau were Sunni, even though pockets of Shi'i belief had long existed in towns such as Qom and Kashan and in parts of Khurasan. The conversion of Iran was one of the most consequential religious changes of the early modern world, and a state drove much of it.
Sunni and Shi'i
The split between Sunni and Shi'i Islam began as a dispute over who should lead the Muslim community after the Prophet Muhammad died in 632. Shi'is held that leadership belonged to Ali and his descendants, the imams. Twelver Shi'is believe that the twelfth imam disappeared from view in the ninth century and remains alive in hiding, to return at the end of time. Over the centuries the two traditions developed different schools of law, rituals, holy places and memories of early Islamic history.
A state religion by decree
Soon after taking Tabriz in 1501, Ismail declared Twelver Shi'ism the official religion of his realm. A later chronicle reports that advisers warned him most of the city's people were Sunni, and that he answered he would draw his sword on anyone who objected. Whether or not the story is exact, it captures the method. Preachers were ordered to add Shi'i phrases to the call to prayer, and Sunni scholars who refused to go along were exiled or killed.
One practice in particular marked the break. Bands of men called tabarra'iyan walked the streets and markets ritually cursing the first three caliphs, Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman, whom Sunnis honor as rightful leaders, and bystanders were expected to call out their approval. For Sunnis, inside and outside Iran, this was deeply offensive, and it made peace with Sunni neighbors harder to reach.
A problem: too few scholars
Ismail's Qizilbash followers were passionate but not learned, and the Shi'ism they practiced was far from the careful legal tradition of the scholars. Iran had few trained Twelver jurists. The Safavids recruited Shi'i scholars from Jabal Amil, in what is now southern Lebanon, along with others from Bahrain and Iraq. The most influential early recruit was Ali al-Karaki, who died in 1534 after Shah Tahmasp had granted him wide authority over religious affairs. These scholars wrote manuals, trained students, served as judges and prayer leaders, and slowly built a learned Shi'i establishment tied to the crown.
Historians debate how large this migration was. Andrew Newman has argued that relatively few scholars from Jabal Amil came, and that many who stayed home disapproved of serving a king. Rula Abisaab sees a sustained and influential movement. Both agree that the imported scholarship mattered far more than the numbers alone would suggest. The debate matters because it shapes how we picture Safavid Shi'ism: as a faith imported by a small foreign elite, or as one that grew from long contact between Iran and older Shi'i centers abroad.
From Sufi devotion to clerical faith
A curious reversal took place over the sixteenth century. The dynasty had begun as a Sufi order whose fighting men revered the shah as a near divine guide. Yet the jurists the shahs invited distrusted ecstatic Sufism and popular messianism. Over time the Safavids moved away from the tribal zeal of the Qizilbash toward the law based Shi'ism of the scholars. The shah increasingly presented himself not as a living saint but as a pious king protecting true religion until the hidden imam returned.
How fast was the change?
Conversion was not instant. Decrees could change sermons, coins and official ritual quickly, but belief in villages and private homes changed over generations. Most historians think Iran did not become largely Shi'i until well into the seventeenth century. Kurdish areas in the west and Baluch areas in the southeast remained mostly Sunni, and largely still are. Shrines, mourning rituals in the month of Muharram for the martyrdom of Imam Husayn at Karbala, and pilgrimage to sites like Mashhad, home of the shrine of the eighth imam, helped root the new faith in everyday life.
Worked example: measuring a conversion
How can a historian tell when a people changed religion if no one ever took a census of belief? Consider three kinds of evidence. First, names: if more children in land deeds and tax lists are called Ali, Husayn or Abbas, and fewer are called Umar or Uthman, that hints at shifting family loyalties. Second, endowments: when donors start funding Shi'i shrines and mourning ceremonies instead of Sunni colleges, their money shows what they valued. Third, complaints: Sunni travelers and refugees who describe pressure and flight show that resistance persisted. Each kind of evidence has gaps. Names follow fashion, gifts can follow politics, and refugees may exaggerate. But when all three move in the same direction over decades, they trace a gradual change, not a single dramatic moment. The lesson reaches beyond Iran. A state can command public behavior quickly, but changing what people believe usually takes generations, and coercion leaves wounds that are remembered long after.
