Skip to main content

Suppose biological race is an illusion, or at least far thinner than people once believed. What should we do with the word and the identities built around it? Philosophers have given three broad answers: get rid of race talk, keep and value racial identity, or rebuild the concept on new foundations.

Eliminativism

Appiah became the leading eliminativist. In his view there are no races in the sense ordinary people have in mind, so eliminativists hold that we should stop treating race as a real division of people. He does not deny that racial identities exist as social facts. People are labeled, treated and self-identify by race, and these practices shape lives. But Appiah worries about what he calls scripts: ready-made stories about how a Black or Asian or white person is supposed to talk, dress and think. Appiah warned that racial identities can harden into scripts that limit individual freedom, so that escaping the insults of racism leads straight into a new set of demands from one's own group. His ideal is a world where individuals compose their own lives from many sources. The philosopher Naomi Zack has also defended eliminativism, partly on behalf of people of mixed ancestry, whom fixed categories force to choose.

Conservationism

Others think eliminating race talk would be premature or harmful. The philosopher Lucius Outlaw defended conserving races as social groups with distinct cultures worth preserving, in the spirit of Du Bois. A more modest view comes from Tommie Shelby. He distinguishes a "thick" conception of Black identity, requiring shared culture, values or ancestry, from a "thin" one based on shared exposure to antiblack racism. Shelby argued that Black solidarity should rest on a shared commitment to fighting racial injustice, not on a thick common identity. People who disagree about religion, music and politics can still stand together against discrimination, and a solidarity that demanded cultural sameness would split apart.

Race as lived and seen

The philosopher Linda Martín Alcoff argues that eliminativists underestimate how deep racial identity runs. Alcoff argues that race operates through habits of visual perception: people notice and sort bodies by appearance before they think, and these habits are learned, often unconsciously. Identities, in her account, are also positions from which people interpret the world. Alcoff describes social identities as interpretive horizons, standpoints that shape what a person notices and understands. They are not merely labels pinned on from outside, and they are not prisons either. On this view, telling people to drop racial identity is like telling them to stop seeing from where they stand. Better to understand those identities, and change the practices that make them harmful.

Reconstruction

A third camp tries to have it both ways. Joshua Glasgow's reconstructionism keeps the word race but gives it a non-biological meaning, roughly a group of people distinguished by visible features, without any claim of deep natural division. Reconstructionists say this preserves the ability to track and remedy racial injustice while discarding the falsehoods. Eliminativists reply that the old meanings will creep back in; conservationists reply that a thin new meaning cannot carry the history and pride that real communities attach to their names.

Assessing the options

Each position has costs. Eliminativism seems to ask the victims of racism to give up a source of identity and solidarity before the racism itself has ended. Conservationism risks freezing groups and policing their members. Reconstruction can look like a compromise that satisfies nobody. There is also a question of who decides. Eliminativists often write as if a society could choose its vocabulary in a seminar, while racial identities are made and remade by millions of people in families, churches, neighborhoods and protests, none of whom wait for philosophers. A fair reader may decide that the right answer differs by context: race talk may be needed for measuring discrimination, while scripts about how members of a race must behave deserve resistance.

Worked example: counting or not counting

Governments face this choice directly. The United States census asks people to choose racial categories, and the data are used to enforce civil rights law and study health and housing gaps. France has taken the opposite path. French law sharply restricts the collection of data revealing racial or ethnic origin, in the name of a republic that sees only citizens, and in 2007 its Constitutional Council struck down a measure that would have eased such statistics. In 2018 the National Assembly even voted to remove the word "race" from the first article of the constitution, though the wider reform stalled. An eliminativist might admire France's refusal to sort citizens. A critic, drawing on Alcoff and Shelby, would note that French researchers have struggled to measure discrimination in hiring and policing without such data, and have turned to tests such as sending identical résumés under different names. The case shows that the debate is not only about words: it decides what a society can see about itself.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. What do eliminativists about race hold?
2. What did Appiah warn racial identities can become?
3. On what did Shelby think Black solidarity should rest?
4. According to Alcoff, through what does race operate?
5. How does Alcoff describe social identities?
6. What does Glasgow's reconstructionism do with the word race?
7. On whose behalf did Naomi Zack partly defend eliminativism?
8. Which thinker defended conserving races as cultural groups in the spirit of Du Bois?

CivilSimian.com created by AxiomaticPanic, CivilSimian, Kalokagathia