Sixty years and more
The Qianlong emperor, born in 1711, took the throne in 1736 and reigned for sixty years. In 1796 he stepped down in favor of his son, because he did not want to reign longer than his grandfather Kangxi, whose 61 years he declined to outdo. Abdication did not mean retirement. As Emperor Emeritus he kept real power until his death in 1799, at 87.
His reign marked the height of Qing power. The empire reached its greatest extent, the treasury was full for decades, and the court poured money into building, collecting and scholarship. Qianlong wrote more than 40,000 poems, stamped his seals on the masterpieces of his collection and posed in portraits as a Confucian sage, a Manchu warrior and a Buddhist bodhisattva.
An empire of many peoples
Qianlong ruled not one country but several, and he spoke to each in its own idiom. To Chinese subjects he was the Son of Heaven. To Mongols he was a khan and a patron of their lamas. To Tibetans he was a protector of Buddhism. Inner Asian affairs were handled by the Lifanyuan, an office for Mongol and other frontier affairs set up before the conquest of China. At the top of the regular bureaucracy, each of the six boards had paired Manchu and Han presidents.
At Chengde, the summer retreat beyond the Great Wall where Mongol princes came to hunt and feast with the emperor, Qianlong built temples in Tibetan style. The largest, finished in 1771, was a copy of the Potala Palace in Lhasa.
The Ten Great Campaigns
In 1792 Qianlong wrote an essay counting ten great military campaigns of his reign and took the title Old Man of the Ten Completions. The list mixed real triumphs with costly failures dressed up as victories.
The triumphs were in the northwest. In the 1750s Qing armies destroyed the Dzungar state, and war, smallpox and massacre wiped out most of its people. The Muslim oasis cities to the south fell soon after, and the whole region became Xinjiang, the "new frontier." Two wars in the Jinchuan highlands of western Sichuan, against small Tibetan chiefdoms, cost enormous sums for little gain.
Elsewhere the record was poor. Four invasions of Burma between 1765 and 1769 failed against Burmese armies and tropical disease, and the Burma campaigns ended in a truce after costly Qing failures. An expedition into Vietnam in 1788 to restore a fallen king was routed early the next year, after which Qianlong recognized the victor as king. A campaign against the Gurkhas of Nepal, who had raided Tibet, pushed Qing troops close to Kathmandu in 1792 and won a settlement.
Tibet and the Golden Urn
Qing troops had entered Lhasa in 1720, and imperial residents were posted there from 1728. After the Gurkha war Qianlong tightened control. In 1793 he decreed that candidates for reincarnated high lamas be chosen by drawing lots from a golden urn, in the presence of Qing officials. He presented it as a guard against noble families rigging the choice. Tibetans did not always follow it, and its meaning remains politically charged today.
Words and power
Qianlong was a great patron of learning, and also its most watchful censor. His compilers gathered books for a vast imperial library and destroyed thousands judged hostile to the dynasty. Prosecutions for writing, known as literary inquisitions, multiplied. In 1777 a scholar named Wang Xihou was executed because his dictionary printed the personal names of the Qing emperors, which were taboo, and because it presumed to criticize Kangxi's great dictionary.
Heshen and the late court
In his last decades Qianlong came to rely on a young Manchu guardsman named Heshen, who rose from 1775 to the highest posts. Heshen built a vast network of patronage, and corruption spread through the bureaucracy. Days after Qianlong died in 1799, his son arrested Heshen and ordered him to take his own life, and his huge fortune was seized.
Worked example: the soulstealing scare of 1768
In the spring of 1768 rumors spread through the lower Yangzi that sorcerers were clipping the ends of men's queues to steal their souls. Wandering monks and beggars were seized by crowds, beaten, and handed to magistrates, who sometimes tortured confessions out of them. The historian Philip Kuhn reconstructed the scare in his book Soulstealers.
What interests historians is how different people read the same panic. Villagers feared magic and strangers. Local officials, knowing the confessions were extracted by torture, mostly wanted the matter quietly dropped. Qianlong saw something else. Cutting the queue was the very act that rebels used to reject Manchu rule, so he suspected sedition and pushed his officials to hunt for a conspiracy. For months the bureaucracy chased a plot that did not exist, until the emperor let it fade.
Kuhn used the case to show how a confident monarch at the height of his power could still be anxious about the loyalty of his Chinese subjects, and how much the system depended on what the ruler chose to believe. Reading the records, a student sees three worlds at once: village fear, bureaucratic caution and imperial suspicion.
