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Picture the astronomers Tycho Brahe and Johannes Kepler standing on a hill at dawn. Tycho believes the Earth is fixed and the Sun circles it; Kepler believes the Earth turns. Do they see the same thing as the Sun appears? The American philosopher Norwood Russell Hanson posed the question in 1958, and his answer was a qualified no. Their retinas receive the same light, but Tycho sees the Sun rising while Kepler sees the horizon dropping away. Hanson's thesis of theory-ladenness holds that what observers see depends partly on what they already believe and know. Observation, the supposed neutral judge of theories, is shaped by theory.

The paradigm and its many meanings

Four years later Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions put that insight at the heart of a history of science. In brief, Kuhn described long stretches of work within a shared framework, punctuated by revolutions in which one framework replaces another. The framework he called a paradigm, and the word escaped into everyday speech. Its looseness drew fire. At a London conference in 1965 the British philosopher Margaret Masterman reported that Kuhn's book used the word "paradigm" in about twenty one different senses.

Kuhn accepted the point. In a postscript to the 1970 edition he separated two meanings. The broad one, which he renamed the disciplinary matrix, is the whole set of commitments a scientific community shares: its laws, its models, its values, its sense of what counts as a good problem. The narrow one he called an exemplar. An exemplar is a model solution to a problem, the kind students learn from textbooks and then imitate. Kuhn thought exemplars were the deeper idea. Physics students work through the inclined plane and the pendulum until they can see a new problem as like one already solved. Scientific knowledge, on this view, lives partly in trained perception.

Incommensurability

Kuhn's most controversial claim concerned what happens across a revolution. He argued that rival paradigms are incommensurable: they lack a common measure by which they can be fully compared. The word comes from mathematics, where it describes quantities with no common unit. Kuhn meant several things by it. Key terms change their meaning: mass in Newton's physics is fixed, while in Einstein's it is convertible into energy, so the two theories are not straightforwardly talking about the same quantity. The list of problems worth solving changes. Even the standards for a good solution change. Kuhn compared the shift to the gestalt switch in the drawing that can be seen as a duck or a rabbit.

If that is right, theory change cannot be settled by a neutral logic of evidence. Kuhn wrote that it sometimes resembled a conversion, and he cited Max Planck's grim observation, in paraphrase, that new ideas often win less by persuading opponents than by outliving them.

The charge of irrationalism

Critics heard in this a description of science as a matter of fashion or crowd psychology. The American philosopher Donald Davidson attacked incommensurability at its root in 1973: a scheme that was wholly untranslatable into ours could not even be recognized as a scheme, since recognizing it would require understanding it. Partial translation, which history shows is possible, means partial comparison.

Kuhn answered that he had never meant theory choice to be irrational. In a 1973 lecture he listed five values that guide it across every paradigm: accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity and fruitfulness. These are shared, but they work as values rather than rules. They can pull in different directions, as when the simpler theory is less accurate, and scientists can weigh the same shared values differently, so reasonable people can disagree for a time without either being irrational.

Kuhn did, however, reject one cherished idea. He described scientific progress as movement away from earlier views rather than toward a final truth, and compared it to Darwinian evolution, which produces ever better adapted forms without aiming at any goal.

Worked example: who discovered oxygen?

In 1774 the English minister and chemist Joseph Priestley heated a red powder made from mercury and collected a gas in which a candle burned with startling brightness. He interpreted it within the reigning chemistry of the day, which held that burning releases a substance called phlogiston. His new gas, he reasoned, was air with its phlogiston removed, and so able to absorb an unusual amount: "dephlogisticated air." That autumn Priestley described his experiment over dinner in Paris to Antoine Lavoisier. Lavoisier repeated the work and came to read it the other way round: burning is not the release of anything, but a combination with a component of the air, which he named oxygen. The Swedish apothecary Carl Wilhelm Scheele had isolated the same gas a little earlier and published later. Kuhn used the case to ask whether discovery can be dated to a single moment. Priestley produced the gas first, yet he never accepted Lavoisier's chemistry and defended phlogiston until his death in 1804. Both men weighed, measured and agreed on what happened in the flask. What they disagreed about was what burning is, and that disagreement shaped what each thought he had found.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. How did Kuhn describe scientific progress?
2. Which is one of the five values Kuhn said guide theory choice?
3. What was Donald Davidson's objection to incommensurability?
4. What does it mean to call rival paradigms incommensurable?
5. What is an exemplar, in Kuhn's later terms?
6. What does Hanson's thesis of theory-ladenness hold?
7. How did Kuhn explain reasonable disagreement over theory choice?
8. What did Margaret Masterman point out about Kuhn's book?

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