Starting from experience
Most sciences study the world by stepping back from how it looks to anyone in particular. Physics describes a sunset as light scattered by air; it does not describe what it is like to watch one. Phenomenology starts from the other end. It is the careful study of experience as it is lived from the first-person point of view: how a cup, a melody, a pain or another person's face shows up for someone. The name joins two Greek words, phainomenon, meaning what appears, and logos, meaning an account. Phenomenology is therefore an account of appearing. As an organized movement it began with Edmund Husserl around 1900, and it went on to shape existentialism, theories of interpretation, French philosophy after the Second World War and much current research on the body and the mind.
Brentano and intentionality
The story begins with Husserl's teacher in Vienna, Franz Brentano, a former Catholic priest who wanted to make psychology a rigorous science. In Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874) he looked for the feature that separates mental phenomena from physical ones. His answer was that every mental act is directed toward an object. To see is to see something. To fear is to fear something, to hope is to hope for something, to love is to love someone. This holds even when the object does not exist, as with a unicorn imagined or a promotion hoped for that never comes. Brentano, borrowing from medieval philosophers, called this feature intentional inexistence, meaning that the object exists "in" the act. His successors simply called it intentionality.
The word can mislead. In phenomenology, intentionality has nothing to do with intending in the everyday sense of planning. An intentional state is one that is about or directed at something. A sudden fright is as intentional as a carefully made decision, because both are aimed at something.
Husserl's turn
Edmund Husserl (1859 to 1938) was born in Prossnitz, Moravia, and trained as a mathematician before studying with Brentano from 1884 to 1886. His first book, Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891), tried to explain numbers through the mental acts of counting and collecting. The logician Gottlob Frege reviewed it harshly in 1894, charging that it confused the objective content of logic with the private events of psychology. Husserl came to agree. In his breakthrough work, Logical Investigations (1900 to 1901), he attacked psychologism, the view that the laws of logic are laws of how human minds happen to work. If that view were right, the law that a statement cannot be both true and false would be a fact about human brains, which could have been otherwise, and truth itself would vary from species to species. Husserl thought this absurd.
Yet logic and meaning do show up in experience: we grasp a proof, see that a claim follows, recognize a word's sense. Husserl wanted to describe how they are given without reducing them to psychology. His rallying cry, from the introduction to the second volume of the Investigations, was that philosophy must go back to "the things themselves". The German word, Sachen, means the matters at hand rather than physical objects. The slogan meant stop building theories from above and describe what actually shows up in experience.
Description, not confession
Phenomenology is easy to confuse with introspective psychology, but the aims differ. A psychologist might measure how long people take to recognize a face. A phenomenologist asks what recognizing a face involves and what structure any such experience must have. The discipline is interested in the general structures of experience, not in one person's private moods. Its descriptions aim to be careful, shareable and open to correction, closer to a naturalist's field notes than to a diary.
One of its first findings concerns ordinary objects. You only ever see one side of a physical thing at a time, yet you perceive a whole thing. Husserl called these partial views profiles or adumbrations. The hidden back of a cup is not seen, but it is "co-meant": you expect it, and you would be surprised to find the cup was a hollow shell. Husserl argued that any perceiver of physical things, however powerful, would meet them in profiles, since that belongs to what a physical thing is.
Around Husserl gathered students in Göttingen and later Freiburg, among them Adolf Reinach, Roman Ingarden and Edith Stein. Martin Heidegger, then Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Levinas, would each remake the method in their own way.
Worked example: a cup of coffee
Take the cup on your desk. A chemist could list its contents and a physicist its temperature. Now describe it as it appears. The handle is turned toward your hand, so the cup shows up as within reach and ready to lift. You see its front, yet you take it as a whole cup with a back you cannot see. The smell reaches you before the taste, and the warmth is anticipated before your fingers touch it.
Notice intentionality at work. You can see the cup, remember yesterday's cup, imagine a cleaner one or want a second cup. The object differs in each case, and so does the way you are directed at it: perceiving, remembering, imagining and wanting are different kinds of act. None of this is a private quirk. Anyone who sees a cup sees it in profiles, and anyone who wants coffee wants something. That is the kind of general structure phenomenology tries to describe.
