In April 1517 a crowd in Cairo watched a sultan hanged from the gate called Bab Zuwayla. He was Tumanbay, the last Mamluk sultan, and his death ended a state that had stood for 267 years. Within a few years Egypt was an Ottoman province. Yet the mamluks themselves did not disappear. They survived under new masters for nearly three centuries more, until one of the most famous massacres in Egyptian history.
Threats from the sea
By 1500 the Mamluk state faced dangers on two fronts. In 1498 the Portuguese navigator Vasco da Gama reached India by sailing around Africa, and Portuguese fleets soon began attacking Muslim merchant ships in the Indian Ocean and trying to divert the spice trade away from the Red Sea. That trade paid a large part of the sultan's revenue. Qansuh al-Ghawri, who became sultan in 1501, sent a fleet to India, built with timber and guns partly supplied by the Ottomans. In 1509 the Portuguese destroyed the Mamluk fleet at Diu, off the coast of Gujarat, and Portugal's command of those waters was not seriously challenged by the Mamluks again.
The trouble with guns
The Mamluks knew about gunpowder. They used cannon in sieges and as early as the fourteenth century, and al-Ghawri built a foundry and formed a corps of musketeers. But firearms fit badly with the Mamluk way of war and of life. Mamluk horsemen looked down on handguns as weapons for low-status infantry, which threatened the mounted skill that justified their rank. The Ottomans, by contrast, had built their Janissary infantry and artillery into the heart of their army.
The Ottoman conquest
The Ottoman sultan Selim I turned south after defeating the Safavid shah of Iran in 1514. Al-Ghawri, then about seventy-five, marched north to meet him. At Marj Dabiq, north of Aleppo, the armies met in August 1516. The Mamluk left wing gave way after its commander, Khayrbak, the Mamluk governor of Aleppo, defected to the Ottomans. Al-Ghawri died on the battlefield, perhaps from a stroke, and his body was never certainly identified.
In Cairo the surviving amirs chose Tumanbay as sultan. He fought the Ottomans outside the city in January 1517, lost, and then waged a stubborn street and guerrilla resistance before being betrayed. Tumanbay was hanged at Bab Zuwayla, one of the old gates of Cairo.
Mamluks without a sultan
Ottoman Egypt was ruled by a governor sent from Istanbul, but power on the ground soon came to rest again with mamluk households. Amirs called beys kept buying slaves from the Caucasus, training them and fighting one another for offices and tax farms. By the eighteenth century some beys ruled Egypt almost independently. In 1798 Napoleon's French army defeated the mamluk beys at the Battle of the Pyramids, where mamluk cavalry charged disciplined infantry squares and were cut down. After the French left, the Ottoman commander Muhammad Ali took power in Egypt. In 1811 Muhammad Ali had the leading mamluks massacred at the Cairo Citadel. The mamluk system in Egypt ended where it had once trained its boys.
Judging the Mamluks
For a long time European and Arab writers treated the Mamluks as a byword for violent foreign tyranny, and the later Circassian era as a time of decline. Recent historians have offered a more mixed picture. They point to the regime's long survival, its defense of Egypt and Syria against the Mongols, its role in protecting the pilgrimage, and the extraordinary buildings, books and objects it left. Critics still point to the plunder of the countryside, the brutality of factional politics and the slave trade that fed the whole system.
Both judgments rest on the same strange fact. The Mamluk Sultanate was a society in which children were bought and sold, and in which some of those children became the most powerful people in it. The system offered astonishing mobility to a few and none at all to the boys who died in barracks, the peasants who fed them, or the families who lost them.
Worked example: the eyewitness and his angle
The fullest account of the conquest comes from Ibn Iyas, a Cairo historian who lived through it and kept a detailed chronicle into the early 1520s. Ibn Iyas was a chronicler who witnessed the Ottoman conquest of Cairo, and his daily notes on prices, rumors, executions and processions are invaluable. How should we read him?
Start with who he was. His grandfather had been a mamluk amir, which made Ibn Iyas one of the awlad al-nas, close to the old elite but outside its inner circle. He loved Cairo, mourned the old order and despised the Ottoman soldiers. His accounts of their looting are probably real, but his praise of Tumanbay's courage also served his own sense of loss. A careful reader uses his detail while asking, at each point, whether his loyalties shaped what he chose to record. That habit applies to every source in this story, from Shajar al-Durr's coins to al-Maqrizi's protests: each was written by someone with a place in the world, and knowing that place is part of knowing what happened.
