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A quiet life, a loud book

Immanuel Kant was born in 1724 in Königsberg, a Baltic port in East Prussia, and died there in 1804. The city is now Kaliningrad, in Russia. The son of a harness maker, he taught at the local university for more than four decades. He never travelled far from home.

After roughly ten years in which he published very little, he brought out the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781, at the age of fifty-seven. It changed the course of philosophy.

Two camps and a stalemate

Kant grew up inside a quarrel. On one side stood the rationalists, such as Leibniz and his follower Christian Wolff, whose textbooks dominated German universities. They held that reason alone, working from clear concepts, could prove truths about God, the soul and the structure of the world. On the other side stood the empiricists, such as Locke and Hume, who traced all our ideas back to experience.

The rationalists built rival systems that no experience could settle; Kant compared metaphysics to a battlefield where no side ever held ground. The empiricists were more modest, but their road led toward scepticism.

Hume's challenge

The sharpest version of the problem came from the Scottish philosopher David Hume. Watch one billiard ball strike another, Hume said, and you see one motion followed by another. You never see the "must," the necessary connection that makes the second ball move. Where, then, does our idea of necessity come from? Hume's answer was habit formed by repeated pairings: after seeing the same sequence many times, the mind comes to expect the second event when it sees the first, and it projects that feeling of expectation onto the world.

In his Prolegomena of 1783, Kant wrote that the memory of Hume was what had first interrupted his dogmatic slumber many years before. If Hume was right, then the principle that every event has a cause, which all of physics relies on, was only a custom of the human mind.

Sorting judgments

Kant's first tool was a pair of distinctions. A judgment is analytic when its predicate is already contained in its subject. Kant's example was "All bodies are extended": the idea of taking up space is part of what we mean by "body," so denying it contradicts itself. A judgment is synthetic when the predicate adds something new. "All bodies are heavy" tells us more than the concept of body contains.

The second distinction concerns how we know. A priori knowledge is independent of experience; a posteriori knowledge comes through it. Analytic judgments are all a priori, since we only need to understand the words. Most synthetic judgments are a posteriori: we learn that a swan is black by looking.

The hard case is the synthetic a priori: a judgment that tells us something new about the world, yet is known to be necessary before any experience. Kant believed such judgments exist. His most famous example was seven plus five equals twelve. The concept of "the sum of seven and five," he argued, does not contain the concept of twelve; you must count or construct the sum to reach it, yet you know the answer holds always and everywhere. Geometry and the basic principles of natural science, such as "every event has a cause," belong in the same class. So Kant put one question at the center of his project: how are synthetic a priori judgments possible?

The Copernican turn

Kant's answer reversed an old assumption. Copernicus had explained the heavens by letting the observer move instead of the stars. Kant proposed a similar experiment. Philosophers had assumed that our knowledge must conform to objects. Suppose instead that objects conform to our ways of knowing. Then we could know some features of every possible object in advance, because experience itself supplies them.

Kant did not claim that minds create rocks and rivers, only that the form of experience comes from us. The necessity Hume could not find in the world might lie in the conditions of experiencing a world.

Worked example: the detective's timeline

A fire investigator arrives at a burned warehouse. She does not yet know what caused the blaze, but she never considers the possibility that it had no cause at all. For Hume, her confidence is habit, the residue of every fire she has ever seen. For Kant, it is something deeper: a condition of her being able to build a timeline at all.

Kant illustrated the point with two cases. When you look over a house, you may see the roof first and then the door, or the door first and then the roof. The order is up to you. When you watch a ship drift downstream, you must see it upriver first and downriver second. Only by treating that order as fixed by a rule can you tell an event in the world from a mere sequence in your own head.

The investigator's report says the fire spread from the east wing to the west. She can claim this only because she treats the order as governed by causes: the burn patterns could not have arisen in reverse. The particular cause, a faulty heater perhaps, she learns a posteriori, by evidence. The principle that there is some cause to find, Kant argued, she brings to the scene a priori.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. Where did Kant live for nearly his whole life?
2. Which thinkers held that reason alone could prove truths about God and the soul?
3. On Hume's view, where does our idea of causal necessity come from?
4. What did Kant say the memory of Hume first did for him?
5. When is a judgment analytic, in Kant's terms?
6. Which of these did Kant offer as a synthetic a priori judgment?
7. What question did Kant place at the center of his project?
8. In Kant's Copernican turn, what conforms to what?

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