The Holocaust involved perpetrators, victims and a third, much larger group: everyone else. Neighbors, churches, governments and foreign powers all knew something and had some room to act. Most did little. A minority took terrible risks to help.
Rescuers
Yad Vashem honors non-Jews who saved Jews as Righteous Among the Nations. To qualify, a rescuer must have risked life or liberty without seeking payment. More than 28,000 people have been recognized, and the largest number come from Poland, where hiding a Jew was punishable by death for the whole family. In December 1942 the Polish underground set up Zegota, a Council to Aid Jews that found hiding places and forged papers. Rescue took many forms. Chiune Sugihara, Japan's vice consul in Kaunas, issued transit visas to Jewish refugees in 1940 against his government's instructions, saving thousands. In Budapest in 1944 the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg issued protective passes and rented safe houses; he was arrested by Soviet forces in January 1945 and never seen again. In the French mountain village of Le Chambon-sur-Lignon, Pastor André Trocmé and his Protestant community sheltered thousands of refugees, many of them Jewish children, in homes, farms and boarding houses.
States differed too. Bulgaria, a German ally, did not hand over the roughly 48,000 Jews of its prewar territory after protests from members of parliament and church leaders in 1943. Yet Bulgaria deported more than 11,000 Jews from lands it occupied in Greece and Yugoslavia, nearly all murdered at Treblinka. Rescue and complicity could exist in the same government in the same month.
What the world knew
Detailed reports reached the Allies. In 1942 the Polish underground courier Jan Karski carried eyewitness evidence to London and later to Washington. On 17 December 1942 the Allies issued a joint declaration condemning the extermination of Europe's Jews and promising punishment. Little rescue followed for over a year. In January 1944 the United States created the War Refugee Board, which helped fund Wallenberg's work. That spring two prisoners who escaped from Auschwitz, Rudolf Vrba and Alfred Wetzler, wrote a detailed report on the camp; its spread added to the pressure that led Hungary's regent, Miklos Horthy, to halt the deportations in July 1944.
Remembering
Memory grew in stages. In the first postwar years many survivors found that few wanted to listen. The trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1961 put survivor testimony before a world audience, and the Frankfurt Auschwitz trials of 1963 to 1965, pressed by prosecutor Fritz Bauer, made Germans face the camps in their own courts. An American television series called Holocaust, broadcast in 1978 and in West Germany in 1979, made the word familiar to millions. Since the 1990s the artist Gunter Demnig has set Stolpersteine, small brass plaques in the pavement in front of victims' last chosen homes, each giving a name and a fate; there are now well over 100,000 in many countries. The United Nations marks 27 January, the day Soviet troops reached Auschwitz in 1945, as International Holocaust Remembrance Day.
Denial and distortion
Holocaust denial claims that the genocide did not happen, that gas chambers did not exist, or that the numbers are vastly inflated. It usually presents itself as "just asking questions." In 2000 the British writer David Irving sued the American historian Deborah Lipstadt for libel after she called him a denier. Under English law she had to prove her claim. The judge ruled against Irving, finding that he had deliberately distorted the historical evidence. Distortion is subtler: minimizing a country's own role, treating the Holocaust as a casual comparison for any political dispute, or blaming the victims. Several countries, Germany among them, make denial a crime, while others, such as the United States, protect it as speech and answer it with evidence and education.
Worked example: answering "there is no order"
A common denier move is to say that no written order from Hitler to kill the Jews has been found, so the killing cannot have been a plan. The first part is true; historians have not found such a document, and many think the key decisions were given orally. The conclusion does not follow. Historians prove events by the convergence of many independent sources, not by a single paper. Take one. In January 1943 an SS officer in Lublin, Hermann Höfle, sent a radio message listing arrivals at four camps during 1942, with a total of 1,274,166. British codebreakers intercepted it, but its meaning was not grasped at the time. It was found in declassified files and published in 2001. It matches Himmler's statistician's report of early 1943, Himmler's own recorded speeches to SS leaders in October 1943, perpetrators' confessions, railway records, survivor testimony and the physical remains at the sites. Each source has gaps; together they leave no room for doubt. That is how to answer a denier, and it is how history works for every event: by asking what all the evidence, taken together, best explains.
