Skip to main content

Picture the eastern Mediterranean around 1050. No single power ruled it. Greek Christian emperors governed from Constantinople, Muslim caliphs and sultans competed in Cairo and Baghdad, Armenian and Arab princes held mountain towns and coastal cities, and Christians, Muslims and Jews of many kinds lived side by side under whichever ruler happened to be strong. The wars later called the crusades grew out of this crowded world, and they make little sense without it.

Two caliphates and a Turkish sultan

Islam had been politically divided for centuries. In Egypt the Fatimids ruled from Cairo as a Shi'a caliphate, rivals in faith and power to the Sunni Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad. The Fatimids also held much of Syria and Palestine, including, for long stretches, Jerusalem. The Abbasid caliphs, by contrast, had lost most of their real power to military strongmen.

The newest strongmen came from Central Asia. The Seljuks were Turkish chiefs who had converted to Sunni Islam, and in 1055 the Seljuks took Baghdad, the seat of the Abbasid caliph, ruling in the caliph's name as sultans. Turkish horsemen pushed west into Byzantine Anatolia, and after the Byzantine defeat at Manzikert in 1071 they spread across the peninsula. Within a few years Nicaea, barely a hundred miles from Constantinople, became the capital of a Seljuk sultanate in Anatolia, the state later known as the Sultanate of Rum.

Seljuk power looked overwhelming, but it was brittle. When the vizier Nizam al-Mulk and Sultan Malik-Shah both died in 1092, the Seljuk empire broke into quarrelling successor states. Brothers, sons and generals fought one another for Aleppo, Damascus, Mosul and Anatolia. Jerusalem itself changed hands: a Turkish commander seized it from the Fatimids in the 1070s, and the Fatimids of Egypt retook Jerusalem in 1098, only a year before the crusaders arrived at its walls. The armies from the West would find not a united Muslim front but a patchwork of rivals, many more worried about each other than about Franks.

Pilgrims and knights in the West

Western Christians had traveled to Jerusalem as pilgrims for centuries, to pray at the places tied to Christ's life and death. The holiest was the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, built over the traditional site of his tomb. In a rare act of persecution, the Fatimid caliph al-Hakim ordered the Church of the Holy Sepulchre destroyed in 1009. His successors allowed it to be rebuilt with Byzantine help, and pilgrimage resumed, sometimes in huge armed companies.

At home, Western Europe was violent in a local, grinding way. Castles multiplied, and knights fought private wars over land and honor, often at the expense of peasants and churches. Bishops responded with a movement that historians call the Peace of God. Starting at church councils in the late 900s, the Peace of God tried to shield clergy, peasants and the unarmed from knights' violence, backed by oaths sworn on saints' relics. Crowds gathered in open fields to watch knights swear, and the relics of local saints were carried out from their churches to witness the promises. A related Truce of God banned fighting on certain days of the week and holy seasons. The church was learning to steer knightly violence, and a reforming papacy was growing confident that it could lead Christendom. In 1074 Pope Gregory VII even proposed leading an army east himself to aid the Byzantines, though his quarrel with the German emperor ended the plan.

The emperor's appeal

The Byzantine emperor Alexios I Komnenos had seized the throne in 1081 and spent years fighting Normans, nomads and rebels. He knew Western knights well, since he hired them as mercenaries. At the Council of Piacenza in March 1095, envoys from Alexios asked Pope Urban II for military help against the Turks. Alexios almost certainly wanted companies of soldiers under his own command to win back Anatolia. What he got, two years later, was something no one had planned: tens of thousands of armed pilgrims with their own leaders and their own goal.

Worked example: why 1095 and not 1071?

Manzikert, the great Byzantine defeat, happened in 1071. The First Crusade was called almost a quarter century later. Why the delay? A useful method is to sort causes into three kinds. Long-standing conditions made a crusade possible: a tradition of pilgrimage to Jerusalem, a warrior class that churchmen were trying to discipline, and a papacy eager to lead. Recent changes made it attractive or likely to succeed: the Seljuk breakup after 1092 left Syria and Palestine divided and weak, though no one in the West fully understood that yet. A trigger set it in motion: the appeal at Piacenza, which came to a pope who had just won enough security at home to act abroad.

This sorting has a lesson. The causes of an event and the causes of its success are not the same. Western knights did not march because the Seljuks were divided; most had never heard of Malik-Shah. But that division goes a long way toward explaining why a tired, hungry and leaderless army could take Jerusalem in 1099 when far larger forces failed later. Good historical explanation keeps the two questions apart.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. Which dynasty ruled from Cairo as a Shi'a caliphate?
2. What did the Seljuks take in 1055?
3. Which city became the capital of a Seljuk sultanate in Anatolia?
4. What followed the deaths of Nizam al-Mulk and Malik-Shah in 1092?
5. Who held Jerusalem when the crusaders reached it in 1099?
6. What did the caliph al-Hakim order in 1009?
7. What did the Truce of God ban?
8. What happened at the Council of Piacenza in March 1095?

CivilSimian.com created by AxiomaticPanic, CivilSimian, Kalokagathia