Against atomism
The Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor came to the debate with interests that ran from Hegel to the philosophy of language, and with practical experience in Quebec politics. In an influential 1979 essay he attacked what he called atomism: the view that individuals are self-sufficient outside society. Social contract theories since Hobbes and Locke, he argued, start from individuals who already have rights and then ask what society they would agree to. That starting point hides the social conditions that make such individuals possible.
Taylor's alternative is the social thesis. The capacities that make freedom valuable grow only in society: the ability to reflect, to weigh options, to form a life plan, to speak a language rich enough to describe one's own aims. No one develops these alone. Language, culture and institutions are not optional extras added to finished persons.
From this he drew a striking conclusion. If you prize liberty and the capacities it rests on, you cannot consistently deny any duty toward the society that sustains them. Those who prize rights owe support to the society that makes them possible. A pure doctrine of rights with no matching obligations, he argued, undermines itself.
Strong evaluation and frameworks
In Sources of the Self (1989) Taylor offered a fuller picture of identity. Human beings do not just have desires; we judge them. Strong evaluation means judging desires as higher or lower, worthy or base, and not merely as more or less intense. I may want a drink and want to keep a promise, and see the second as the more important. These judgments rest on frameworks of meaning that we inherit and argue about with others. To know who I am is to know where I stand in such a framework, and I learn it in conversation with others: parents, teachers, friends, rivals. This is why Taylor thought identity cannot be a purely private matter: the very words I use to judge my own desires were taught to me, and I keep testing them against the judgments of people I respect.
The politics of recognition
Taylor's best-known contribution is his 1992 essay on the politics of recognition. If identity is formed in dialogue, then how others see us matters a great deal. Taylor argued that misrecognition can lock people into a demeaning picture of themselves. Groups long portrayed as inferior may absorb that image, and the harm is real, not merely hurt feelings.
Taylor described two ideas of equal respect that grew from the modern ideal of human dignity. The politics of equal dignity insists that everyone has the same rights and should be treated in the same, difference-blind way. The politics of difference asks that distinct identities be recognized, not ignored: a minority language, a religious practice, a culture's survival. Each accuses the other of failing at equality. Difference-blind rules can quietly favor the majority's culture; special recognition can seem to betray the promise of treating everyone alike.
Quebec as a test case
Taylor wrote with Quebec in mind. French speakers are a minority in North America, and many feared their language would not survive. Quebec's Charter of the French Language of 1977 required most immigrant children to attend French-language schools and made French the language of work, commerce and public signs. To many English-speaking Canadians and liberal lawyers this looked like an attack on individual rights.
Taylor argued that a liberal society could legitimately pursue a collective goal such as the survival of a culture. His defense rested on a distinction: fundamental rights, such as life, liberty, free speech and religion, versus lesser privileges that may be limited, such as the choice of language on a commercial sign. A liberalism that never allows the first kind of goal, he thought, is too rigid to serve diverse societies.
Critics such as Jürgen Habermas replied that cultures cannot be protected like endangered species: they survive only if members freely choose to keep them, and the state must not lock individuals into a group identity. Others asked who decides which identity a group has, and whether dissenters inside a group get recognized too.
Worked example: reasonable accommodation
In 2007 Quebec's government asked Taylor and the historian Gérard Bouchard to study public anger over "reasonable accommodation" of religious minorities. The disputes were small: a prayer space at a university, a frosted gym window, a Sikh boy's kirpan at school. The commission's report in 2008 favored an open form of secularism and an approach it called interculturalism, in which French serves as the common public language while newcomers' cultures are respected.
The case shows Taylor's ideas under pressure. The politics of recognition asks officials to take a minority's identity seriously. The politics of equal dignity asks them to apply one rule to all. A good answer, on Taylor's view, comes from dialogue in which each side explains what is at stake for it, rather than from a formula fixed in advance. Quebec's later laws on religious symbols for public employees, which Taylor criticized, show that the argument is far from settled.
