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Imagine two neighbors with identical wages. One is healthy. The other has kidney disease that requires dialysis three times a week, a special diet and long trips to a clinic. On paper they are equally well off. In life they plainly are not. The capabilities approach begins from this gap between what people have and what they are actually able to do and to be.

The question behind the approach

In 1979 the Indian economist and philosopher Amartya Sen gave a lecture at Stanford University with a blunt title: Equality of What? Almost everyone, he noted, favors equality of something. Libertarians want equal rights, utilitarians count everyone's pleasure equally, and egalitarians want fairer shares of income. The real argument is about which thing people should be made equal in, the space in which we compare one person's advantage with another's. Sen's answer, developed over the following decades, was that we should compare people's capabilities: the real freedoms they have to achieve the things they value on reflection.

Three rivals

Sen tested his idea against three familiar standards. The first is utility, meaning happiness or the satisfaction of desires, the measure favored by utilitarians and by much of welfare economics. Its weakness, Sen argued, is that it reads advantage entirely through a person's mental states. In his lecture he imagined a person with a disability who gets less pleasure out of a given amount of income than others do. A strict utilitarian, aiming to maximize total pleasure, might give the disabled person less, because each dollar yields less utility in that person's hands.

The second rival is resources: income, wealth and the goods that money can buy. Resources are visible and measurable, and they respect people's freedom to use them as they choose. The problem is that people differ in how well they can turn resources into living well. A pregnant woman needs more food than a man of the same size who is not doing heavy work. A person in a wheelchair needs more money to get around than someone who can walk.

The third rival was the most respected of all: the primary goods of John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971), a list including basic rights and liberties, opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect. Rawls designed primary goods as all-purpose means, things any rational person would want whatever else they want. Sen admired Rawls but argued that a focus on primary goods mistakes the means of a good life for the life itself, a kind of fetishism about goods. Two people with the same bundle of primary goods can enjoy very different freedoms.

The core idea

The capabilities approach shifts attention from inputs to what Sen called functionings and capabilities. A functioning is something a person does or is, such as being nourished, reading, moving about or taking part in community life. A capability is the real opportunity to achieve such functionings. Income matters on this view, but only as a means. The question is what it lets people do. Health matters, but so does whether a person can appear in public without shame, have a say in decisions that affect them, and form close relationships.

The approach is not a single theory but a family of views sharing a framework. Sen developed it as a tool for welfare economics and the study of development, while the American philosopher Martha Nussbaum turned it into a theory of basic justice with a fixed list of capabilities.

Older roots

Sen and Nussbaum both pointed to ancestors. Aristotle argued that wealth is only a means. In the Nicomachean Ethics, in W. D. Ross's 1925 translation, he wrote that "wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else." Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations (1776), observed that what counts as a necessity depends on a society's customs: in his day "a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt." Smith's point, as Sen later read it, is that one capability, such as appearing in public without shame, can need different goods in different places. That is why no fixed basket of goods can capture poverty everywhere.

Why it matters for dignity

Underneath the technical vocabulary lies a moral claim. Measuring people by what they own treats them as consumers. Measuring them by their happiness treats them as containers of feelings. The capabilities approach treats each person as an agent whose freedom to shape a life is what counts. It also insists on looking at individuals, not only at households or nations, because a rich family can hold a poorly fed daughter.

Worked example: the two neighbors

Return to the neighbors. Call them Ruth and Tomas. Both earn the same wage, so a resource measure scores them as equal. A capability measure asks different questions. Can Ruth hold a full-time job given her clinic schedule? Can she travel to see her grandchildren? Does she have time and energy left for friends? On each count her real freedom is smaller than Tomas's, even though her paycheck is identical. The capability view does not by itself say how much extra help Ruth is owed. But it shows why equal income here hides an unequal life, and it names the thing to look at: what each person is actually able to do and be.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. What was the central question of Sen's 1979 lecture?
2. Why, in Sen's example, might a strict utilitarian give a disabled person less?
3. What is the main problem Sen saw with comparing people's resources?
4. What did Sen say a focus on primary goods mistakes?
5. What is a functioning?
6. Who turned the approach into a theory of basic justice with a fixed list?
7. What did Smith's linen shirt show, as Sen read it?
8. Why does the approach look at individuals, not only households?

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