Around 1900 a small group of philosophers in Cambridge and Jena began doing philosophy in a new way. They did not found a school with a creed. What they shared was a method: breaking a problem into smaller parts and arguing for each step explicitly, using the new tools of formal logic wherever they could. Over the next century this style, now called analytic philosophy, came to dominate university philosophy in Britain, North America, Scandinavia and Australia, and it remains the way most philosophy is taught in English today.
What the rebels rebelled against
When Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore were students at Cambridge in the 1890s, the leading philosophy in British universities was British idealism, inspired by the German philosopher Hegel. Its most admired voice, F. H. Bradley of Oxford, argued in Appearance and Reality (1893) that reality is a single unified whole, the Absolute, and that ordinary separate things are mere appearance. Tables, people, moments of time and even the relations between them were, on this view, not fully real. Only the whole was.
Idealism was not foolish. Its defenders were careful thinkers who noticed real puzzles about how separate things can be related at all. But around 1898 Moore, soon followed by Russell, turned against it. They insisted that the world contains many independent things, that relations between them are real, and that the job of philosophy is to get clear about what we mean when we talk about them.
Clarity, logic and science
Three habits marked the new approach. The first was a demand for clarity: a claim should be stated so precisely that others can see exactly what would count against it. The second was a reliance on logic, which in these decades was being rebuilt into a powerful mathematical tool. The third was a respect for the natural sciences. Most analytic philosophers have seen philosophy as continuous with science, borrowing its rigor and helping to clarify its concepts, rather than as a rival source of higher wisdom.
A fourth idea arrived a little later and gave the movement its best known slogan. Many analytic philosophers came to believe that philosophical problems arise from misunderstandings of how language works. The linguistic turn is the view that philosophical problems can be solved or dissolved by attending closely to language. The phrase was coined by the philosopher Gustav Bergmann, but it became famous when Richard Rorty used it as the title of a 1967 anthology. Not every analytic philosopher took the turn, and many later turned back, but for half a century it shaped the field.
Two traditions
Analytic philosophy is often set against continental philosophy, the traditions of phenomenology, existentialism and critical theory that flourished in France and Germany. The contrast is rough. Frege and the Vienna Circle were continental by geography, and many thinkers have worked across the line. Still, the two traditions tended to differ in style: analytic writers favored short arguments, technical precision and engagement with science, while continental writers more often wrote about history, culture and lived experience in a literary voice.
A logician for citizens
Analytic philosophy is sometimes accused of retreating into technical puzzles. Its history shows otherwise. Susan Stebbing (1885 to 1943) was a leading logician and the first woman to hold a chair of philosophy in Britain, at Bedford College, London, from 1933. As fascism rose in Europe she turned her skills outward. Her book Thinking to Some Purpose (1939) applied logic to political speeches and the popular press, showing readers how loaded words, false dilemmas and hidden assumptions worked on them. Stebbing believed that a democracy depends on citizens who can tell an argument from a slogan, and that teaching people to do so treats them as reasoners who deserve reasons, not as crowds to be steered.
That conviction runs through the best of the tradition. Clear argument is a form of respect. It lays out its premises so that anyone can check them, and it accepts that a good objection from anyone, however humble, must be answered.
Worked example: "crime is out of control"
Imagine a candidate for mayor declares that crime is out of control. An analytic philosopher would not begin by agreeing or disagreeing. She would first break the claim into parts. Which crimes: burglary, assault, fraud, car theft? Compared with when: last year, ten years ago, the worst year on record? Measured how: by police reports, which depend on how often people call the police, or by surveys asking residents whether they were victims? And what does "out of control" mean: rising, high, or beyond the reach of any policy?
Each part can now be checked. Perhaps reported car thefts doubled while assaults fell, and survey data show little change overall. The original sentence turns out to bundle several claims, some true and some false. Nothing in this exercise tells you how to vote. But it replaces a contest of moods with questions that evidence can answer, which is exactly what the founders of analytic philosophy hoped their method would do for the hardest questions of all.
