Properly understood, then, the desire to act justly derives in part from the desire to express most fully what we are or can be, namely free and equal rational beings with the liberty to choose.

The fundamental criterion for judging any procedure is the justice of its likely results.

Essentially the fault lies in the fact that the democratic political process is at best regulated rivalry; it does not even in theory have the desirable properties that price theory ascribes to truly competitive markets.

Justice does not require that men must stand idly by while others destroy the basis of their existence.

An intolerant sect has no right to complain when it is denied an equal liberty. ... A person's right to complain is limited to principles he acknowledges himself.

Let us now consider whether justice requires the toleration of the intolerant, and if so under what conditions. There are a variety of situations in which this question arises. Some political parties in democratic states hold doctrines that commit them to suppress the constitutional liberties whenever they have the power. Again, there are those who reject intellectual freedom but who nevertheless hold positions in the university. It may appear that toleration in these cases is inconsistent with the principles of justice, or at any rate not required by them.

The suppression of liberty is always likely to be irrational.

We must choose for others as we have reason to believe they would choose for themselves if they were at the age of reason and deciding rationally.

Clearly when the liberties are left unrestricted they collide with one another.

Ideally a just constitution would be a just procedure arranged to insure a just outcome.