In all sectors of society there should be roughly equal prospects of culture and achievement for everyone similarly motivated and endowed. The expectations of those with the same abilities and aspirations should not be affected by their social class.

The first statement of the two principles reads as follows. First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both(a)reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.

Our concern is solely with the basic structure of society and its major institutions and therefore with the standard cases of social justice.

Intuitionism is not constructive, perfectionism is unacceptable.

We may suppose that everyone has in himself the whole form of a moral conception.

An intuitionist conception of justice is, one might say, but half a conception.

An individual who finds that he enjoys seeing others in positions of lesser liberty understands that he has no claim whatever to this enjoyment.

Indeed, it is tempting to suppose that it is self evident that things should be so arranged so as to lead to the most good.

A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self evident premises or conditions on principles; instead, its justification is a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitted together into one coherent view.

It may be expedient but it is not just that some should have less in order that others may prosper.