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The genocide in Rwanda happened in plain sight. Peacekeepers were already in the country, journalists filmed bodies in the streets, and diplomats sent cables home within days. The failure to stop it was not a failure of knowledge but of will, and its causes say much about how governments weigh distant lives.

A warning ignored

UNAMIR was small, lightly armed and governed by strict rules of engagement. On 11 January 1994 General Dallaire sent a coded cable to UN headquarters in New York, later known as the "genocide fax." An informant inside the Interahamwe had told UNAMIR that militias were registering Tutsi in Kigali, hiding weapons and could kill as many as a thousand Tutsi in twenty minutes. Dallaire asked permission to raid the arms caches. The UN peacekeeping department refused and told him to share the information with President Habyarimana and with the Belgian, French and American embassies instead. The caches stayed where they were.

Withdrawal

When the killing began, the death of the ten Belgian peacekeepers did what extremists had hoped. Belgium withdrew its contingent, the backbone of UNAMIR, and urged the Security Council to end the mission. On 21 April 1994 the Security Council voted to cut UNAMIR to about 270 troops. Western countries flew in soldiers to evacuate foreign citizens and then left, while Rwandans who had sheltered with foreigners were left behind. Dallaire stayed with a skeleton force and later argued that a few thousand well equipped soldiers could have stopped much of the killing. Others doubt that so small a force would have been enough, but few dispute that more troops would have saved many lives.

Even with almost nothing, peacekeepers made a difference. Captain Mbaye Diagne, a Senegalese officer serving as a UN military observer, defied orders and drove through roadblocks again and again, talking, joking and bribing his way past militias to carry people to safety. He is credited with saving hundreds of lives before he was killed by a mortar shell on 31 May 1994. In 2014 the UN created a medal for exceptional courage in his name.

Avoiding a word

Under the Genocide Convention of 1948, states pledged to prevent and punish genocide. Officials in several governments feared that saying the word would create pressure to act. In the United States, still shaken by the deaths of American soldiers in Somalia in October 1993, the government had just tightened its rules for supporting peacekeeping, and officials were told to avoid calling events in Rwanda genocide. For weeks spokespeople spoke only of "acts of genocide." The Security Council did not use the word genocide in its resolutions until weeks into the killing. In mid May it authorized an expanded force, but member states were slow to provide troops and equipment, and almost none arrived before the genocide ended.

France and Opération Turquoise

France had been the regime's closest ally since 1990. In late June, with UN approval, it launched Opération Turquoise, creating a "safe humanitarian zone" in the southwest. French troops saved thousands of Tutsi, but the zone also allowed members of the interim government, army and militias to retreat into Zaire. Critics called it a rescue mission for the regime; defenders said it was the only intervention anyone offered. In 2021 a commission of French historians appointed by President Macron, led by Vincent Duclert, concluded that France bore heavy and overwhelming responsibilities for backing a racist regime and ignoring warnings, though it found no evidence of complicity in genocide. Weeks later Macron, speaking in Kigali, recognized France's role and asked survivors for the gift of forgiveness.

Apologies and inquiries

Other reckonings followed. Belgium's Senate investigated in 1997, and its prime minister later apologized. President Bill Clinton, speaking at Kigali airport in March 1998, apologized for the failure to act. An independent inquiry for the UN, published in 1999, found a fundamental failure across the UN system, including the Secretariat, the Security Council and member states. Partly in response, governments later endorsed the principle that states have a responsibility to protect their people from mass atrocities, and that others may act when they fail.

Worked example: the school at Kicukiro

On 7 April 1994 about two thousand people, most of them Tutsi, sought refuge at the Ecole Technique Officielle, a school in Kicukiro, Kigali, where about ninety Belgian peacekeepers were based. Militias gathered outside the gates but did not attack while the soldiers stood guard. On 11 April the Belgian unit was ordered to leave to help evacuate Europeans. Some of those inside begged the soldiers to shoot them rather than leave them to the machetes. As the trucks drove off, the militias moved in. Most of the people were marched to a nearby hill at Nyanza and killed.

Apply this level's ideas to the school. A small, armed force could hold off the killers simply by being there, which supports Dallaire's view that presence mattered. The order to leave reflected the priority given to foreign citizens over Rwandans. And the decision was made far from Kigali by officials who did not see the faces at the gate. The event has become a symbol of what the world's withdrawal meant on the ground.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. What did Dallaire's cable of 11 January 1994 ask permission to do?
2. How did UN headquarters respond to the genocide fax?
3. What did the Security Council vote to do on 21 April 1994?
4. Who was Mbaye Diagne?
5. How did the Security Council handle the word genocide in spring 1994?
6. What did Opération Turquoise create?
7. What did the Duclert commission conclude in 2021?
8. Where did President Clinton apologize for the failure to act?

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